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Abstract 
Land protests account for a large portion of all protests in China, but existing scholarship on 
this topic does not explain under which conditions large-scale land protests succeed or fail. 
This thesis will attempt to answer this question by focusing on five large-scale land protests 
that happened in China from 2012 to 2017. I argue that large-scale land protests are more 
likely to succeed under three conditions: when 1) domestic media reports on this protest are 
supportive or on the protesters’ side; 2) the protests are violent, and 3) the protests occur in 
the early stages of a developmental project. Those conditions do not work in isolation, but  
they coincide with protest success in those five cases that I investigated in this research. 
Using media analysis and doing a one-and-a-half-month-long period of fieldwork in China, I 
found that domestic media in China played two roles in determining the outcome of a protest: 
a “catalyst” role or a “watchdog” role. I also distinguished between short-term outcomes and 
long-term outcomes and found that the success of a short-term outcome will not necessarily 
guarantee the long-term outcome of a protest. Thirdly, I found that not only does the level of 
violence of the protest matter, but also which side used violence first affects the outcome of a 
large-scale land protest. This research contributed to the literature on contentious politics in 
China by highlighting under what conditions do large-scale land protests in China tend to 
succeed in the Xi Jinping era. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
As China’s economy has expanded dramatically in the last four decades, protests have also 
exploded throughout the country. According to China’s official statistics, there were 8,700 
mass incidents (qunti xing shijian or 群体性事件) in 1993. This number increased to over 
10,000 in the following year, and it has continued to surge ever since, reaching 87,000 cases in 
2005 (Song, 2010:5-11; Tang, 2013: 2; Shambaugh, 2016:62). China’s government has not 
made any such figures available since 2005, but some prominent scholars have provided 
estimates, including Sun Liping, a well-known sociologist from Tsinghua University, who 
estimated that there were over 180,000 protests in China in 2010 (Demick, 2011).       
Among these protests, land-related protests, such as land expropriation and anti-demolition 
protests, accounted for a large portion (Yu, 2016). From January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2004, 
land-related issues accounted for 67 percent of all call-ins on rural issues on a famous China 
Central Television (CCTV) program (Yu, 2004; Cai, 2010:56). Perhaps the most famous land 
protest in China in the last two decades was the so-called “Wukan Incident,”1 which happened 
in 2011 in Guangdong province. Land protests have continued since then. From June 2013 to 
June 2016, Lu Yuyu and Li Tingyu recorded 74,452 protests by collecting data from the 
internet, particularly social media.2 Göbel analyzed their dataset and found that land-related 
protests accounted for 15 percent of all the protests, a substantial percentage, though lower than 
previously expected (Göbel, 2017:20).  
 
1 I will describe this case in more detail in the next chapter. 
2 They were arrested by the Chinese government in 2016, and they were sentenced to a 4-year prison 
term in 2017 by a Chinese court. See: Austin Ramzy, “Chinese Court Sentences Activist Who 
Documented Protests to 4 Years in Prison”, The New York Times, August 4, 2017; 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/world/asia/china-blogger-lu-yuyu-prison-sentence-protests-
picking-quarrels.html?_ga=2.8686581.1560533960.1539134121-344023349.1477373723, (accessed 
October 18, 2018). 
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        In 2012, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, came to power. He became general secretary of 
the Communist Party of China (CPC), chairman of the Central Military Commission and 
president of the People's Republic of China (PRC). By then, China had entered a new “era” of 
“hard authoritarianism.” 3 China’s nascent civic society was eroded by the new government. 
Censorship on China’s social media became increasingly strict, while many public intellectuals 
were purged by the central government. 4  China also enacted new laws to regulate non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), especially those with connections with foreign 
organizations. It became increasingly difficult for overseas NGOs to operate in China.5 In the 
meantime, under most circumstances, China’s domestic media were not allowed to report on 
protests.6 However, some protests were still reported on by international media, and domestic 
media also sometimes reported on them as well, particularly when severe violence occurred, 
such as the Jinning Incident (2014). 
        Since the Wukan Protest (2011), five large-scale7 land-related protests have been reported 
by international media: the Haosi Protest (2011), Shangpu Incident (2013), Liantang Incident 
(2014), Jinning Incident (2014) and Tianmu Protest (2015). They have been the most influential 
land protests since the Wukan Incident, and although they only represent a small number of all 
recent land protests that have occurred in China, they reflect the overall characteristics of 
 
3 According to David Shambaugh (2016, p99), China has entered “new era” since 2009. From 1998–
2008, in his term, China was under “soft authoritarianism.” From 2009 to date (2016), China stepped 
back to “hard authoritarianism.” 
4 Starting with Xue Manzi in 2013, Chinese authorities came after more and more public intellectuals 
who were active on social media and were banned from using China’s social media, such as Li 
pengcheng, Murong Xuecun, He Weifang, Qin Hui, Yu Jianrong, Li Kaifu, and so on. China’s social 
media is now dominated by people who support this regime. 
5 For a more detailed description after entering the “new era,” see Shambaugh (2016, P117-124). 
6 Reporting on protests is usually forbidden for China’s journalists. Because all of China’s news 
outlets are controlled by the propaganda department, if they dare to violate these regulations, they will 
face punishment. See Stern & Hassid (2012). But under very rare circumstances, some kinds of 
protests are allowed to be reported on, especially when severe violence, including causalities, occurs. 
Environmental protests have sometimes been reported on, especially from 2011 to 2013. 
7 A large-scale protest by Cai’s (2010) standard means that a protest has at least 500 participants. Also 
see Yang (2016). 
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contemporary large-scale land protests in China. The outcome varies: some were successful, 
some were not successful, and some of the outcomes were not clear from the reports. So why 
did some of these protests succeed? Why did others fail? These questions are part of the puzzle 
this research project wants to solve. 
1.2 Research question, argument and hypotheses 
There have been thousands of land-related protests in rural China: Why are some successful, 
while others fail? What are the factors that make a large-scale protest more likely to succeed? 
I argue that large-scale land protests are most likely to succeed under three conditions: (1) when 
the land protests are reported on by domestic media and the reports are pro-villager; (2)  when 
land protests become violent and (3) when the protest happens at the early stage of a project 
that was going to occupy villagers’ lands. The following hypotheses are derived from the 
existing literature on land protests in China:  
        Hypothesis one: if the domestic media’s reports on this protest are supportive or on the 
protesters’ side, then the likelihood of success is higher; if the domestic media’s reports are 
negative or on the local government’s side or if there is no domestic media reporting on this 
case, then the likelihood of success is lower; if there is a lack of domestic media reporting, it 
will more likely lead to a failing result for the villagers. 
        Hypothesis two: the more violent a protest is, the higher its likelihood of success. In turn, 
the less violent a protest, the less likely it is to succeed.  
        Hypothesis three: if a land protest occurs in the early stages of a project that occupies 
villagers’ lands, the likelihood of success is higher. If a land protest happens at the end stage 
of the project, the likelihood of success is lower.  
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Large-scale protests in China refer to protests that have at least 500 participants.8 Not 
all protests met this threshold, of course. Mass incidents (Quntixing shijian) is the official 
Chinese term used to refer to protests. Unlike democratic countries like the US or Canada, 
protests are illegal in China; if you want to protest, you have to get permission from the local 
government. In reality, unless there are very rare circumstances like the 2008 Olympic Games,9 
the Chinese government never allows citizens to protest. But protests are not rare phenomenon; 
they happen all the time. Sometimes, protests are peaceful like in Xiamen (2007), where 
citizens “walked” to protest a chemical plant that was being planned in the city. Other times, 
however, protests can turn very violent, such as the Weng’an (2008) Incident. Even though 
protesting is illegal in China, citizens can petition (Xinfang). Petitioning is a legal channel 
citizen can use to complain about something, such as an injustice or grievance, as every level 
of government has a petition branch. 10 A group of five people or fewer can petition, but 
petitions with more than five participants are illegal. 11  If a petition has more than one 
participant, it is considered a collective petition. Collective petitioning is also a form of protest 
in China. 
Following Cai’s (2010) study, I define a protest as successful, “if the participants 
achieve their goal entirely or partly” (Cai, 2010:8). If the protesters did not get anything but 
repression, then it was unsuccessful or a failed protest. 
 
8 Cai (2010 p44). According to the police department, a collective action involving more than 500 
participants is seen as a large-scale action, and an action involving more than 1000 participants is seen 
as especially large-scale action. (Chen Jinsheng, Quntixing shijian yanjiu baogao) [Research report on 
instances of collective action] [Beijing: Qunzhong Chubanshe, 2004], 32) 
9 To show its openness and make a good impression on international media, before the 2008 Beijing 
Olympic Games began, China’s government allowed citizens to protest in certain areas in Beijing. 
See: Jim Yardley, “China Sets Zones for Olympics Protests,” The New York Times, July 24, 2008; 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/24/sports/olympics/24china.html, (accessed October 10, 2018). 
10 China’s government encourages citizens to write letters to complain, and writing letters to a petition 
branch has the same effect as visiting a petition branch in person. Personally, I have used this channel 
(writing letters) to complain about the unjust treatment of my disabled relative by the local authorities, 
and the problem was solved. 
11 Article 18, State council, 2005, Regulations Concerning Letters and Calls. 
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By domestic media, I mean all media outlets that operate within China’s territory, either 
government-sponsored media, such as CCTV, People’s Daily, China Youth Daily and so on, 
or commercial media outlets, such as Southern Weekly, Caixin Magazine, Caijing Magazine 
and so on. “Domestic media” does not include media outlets blocked by the Great Fire Wall, 
even though they are written in Chinese language, such as Boxun News, Duowei News, 
Dajiyuan News, Mingjing News and so on. By “early stage,” I mean that a project is in an early 
stage of its whole process; for example, if it is at the planning stage and only part the project 
has been started. By “late stage,” I mean that the majority of the project has been finished or is 
close to being finished or if land expropriation has been ongoing for many years when the 
protest happened. 
1.3 Why land-related protests? 
Most of China’s population is registered as rural households (Hukou),12 although, in reality, 
most Chinese people live in urban areas. For these rural residents, land is the most precious 
resource they have. If they lose their lands, they will lose their means of survival, so for them, 
land is everything. But because China is experiencing a rapid urbanization process, a lot of land 
is being expropriated for urban development, but many of them are through “illegal” forms, 
and land acquisition often triggers villagers to go to the streets or get involved in violent 
confrontations.   
        By focusing on land protests, could we better understand how China is handling its fast-
growing urbanization process? How does China’s government treat its own rural residents 
 
12 By the end of 2017, 57.65 percent of Chinese people were registered as living in a rural household. 
See, National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2017, Statistical Communiqué of the People’s Republic of 
China on the 2017 National Economic and Social Development. China’s “Hukou” (household) system 
is divided into urban households and rural households; people who live in urban households can enjoy 
the urban welfare system, such as receiving education, pensions, healthcare and so on. In terms of the 
welfare system, rural households are much worse off than urban households. 
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during this process? What is a better choice for the future? Thus, focusing on land protests has 
very important implications for those living in rural areas. However, it also has academic 
benefits. For example, can land protest logics from democratic regimes also apply to the China 
context? What are the differences between China’s peasants and their counterparts in other 
places of the world? This thesis will contribute to the literature on China’s contentious politics 
by describing a prism of land protests. 
1.4 Who owned China’s lands? 
According to current China’s constitution, which went into effect in 1982, all lands in China’s 
urban areas are owned by the State. In rural areas, collectives owned the lands. Peasants lease 
the lands from the collectives, and on average, each peasant can only be allocated 0.7 mu of 
lands for cultivation. But the household or peasants can not decide which kind of crop to grow 
on his or her lands; they have to use their lands to grow the main staples as the government 
required, which can only bring them a very modest income. As technology improved, there is 
some surplus of labor in the rural areas, and millions of peasants went to the cities to find low-
end jobs to make up for the income that they received from growing crops (Ho, 2005; Zhan, 
2019). 
        The collective owns the lands, and peasants cultivated those lands. But neither the 
collective nor the peasants can sell the lands for other uses, such as building factories or housing 
units. The Chinese law stipulates that only the State can expropriate peasants’ lands and then 
sell it to private developers at a much much high price than what they compensated those 
farmers who lost their lands. As China’s lands have become more and more valuable during 
the last three decades or so, the incentive for local government to sell lands is very high. As 
one scholar captured, 
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“The main motivation of local governments for land expropriation has been the revenue 
generated from the conversion of rural land to urban land. Due to the implementation of 
urban bias policies, urban land has become much more valuable than rural land. This was 
so particularly after the urban housing reform in 1998, which created a market for urban 
real estate. By expropriating rural land and selling the use rights [sic]of the land to real 
estate developers, local governments have reaped an enormous amount of revenue. In 
2017, the land revenue reached a record high, 5.2 trillion yuan, accounting for 56.9 
percent of all local revenue. Between 2004 and 2015, the land revenue had been hovering 
around 50 percent of all local revenue, attesting to its crucial importance in local finance.” 
(Zhan, 2019:76) 
        At the same time, peasants can only receive about five percent to ten percent of 
compensation from this transaction by the government, and the local government received the 
majority of the profit from selling their lands (Zhan, 2005). The imbalance between those 
griefed villagers and the local government became the main reason why, each year, there are 
so many lands-related protests happened in China (Zhan, 2019). 
1.5 Why do some protests in China succeed while others fail?  
Previous studies on protests in China have tended to analyze factors affecting the outcomes of 
all protests or what makes some types of protests more successful than others. Many of them 
have examined the role of government intervention (Cai, 2010), social media (Yang, 2016; Lei, 
2014), framing (Deng, 2010), or violence (Cai, 2008; Cai, 2010; Yang, 2016; Chen, 2012). But 
do these logics apply to land protests? 
        Cai’s (2010) work focused on the role of upper level governments’ intervention, especially 
central or provincial governments. Cai based his theory on rational theory and assumes that 
China’s authorities are calculating costs and benefits when they are making decisions on how 
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to respond to protesters’ actions. He argued that protesters’ success hinges on central or 
provincial governments’ intervention. Therefore, protesters’ strategies should focus on how to 
prompt the central government and provincial governments to “step in.”  He contended that 
“forceful” protests are more likely to be intervened in by central or provincial governments. 
        Others have examined the role of social media. Yang (2016) argued that when protesters 
use social media as an organizational tool rather than as just a “pick-up” tool, then the 
possibilities for a particular protest to succeed were higher. More specifically, if protesters use 
social media to organize and mobilize others to join in their causes, such as what Wukan’s 
young generation did in the Wukan Incident, then social media played a role as an 
organizational tool. But when protesters only use social media to disseminate the outbreak of 
a protest, then social media only played the role of a “pick-up” tool. He contended that when 
the first “function” is used, the possibilities for a protest to succeed are higher. When social 
media is only used as a “pick-up” tool, then the possibilities for success are lower. Lei’s (2014) 
research also emphasised the role of social media in determining the outcome of the Wukan 
Incident. 
        In contrast, Deng’s (2010) research focused on the role of framing in determining the 
outcome of a protest. More specifically, her research focused on an influential environmental 
protest, the Huazhen Incident13, which occurred in 2005 in Zhejiang province. She argued that 
how villagers framed their grievance played a key role in the outcome of this protest. Instead 
of only framing their arguments in environment language, the villagers also used land policy 
and anti-corruption language in their discourse. This strategy expanded the opportunities these 
villagers had. Their framing strategy contributed to the final outcome—a successful 
environmental protest. Similarly, Hurst (2008) and Chen (2008) also explored the role framing 
played in the course of workers’ protests in China. 
 
13 Huazhen is a pseudonym used to protect the participants of this protest. 
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        Last, several studies explored the role of violence in the outcome of protests (e.g., Cai 
2008, 2010; Yang 2016; and Chen 2009, 2012). As aforementioned, in Cai’s theory, in order 
to prompt the central or provincial government to intervene, when protesters have exhausted 
other channels, they will use disruptive tactics such as violence to induce upper-level 
government to “step in” (Cai, 2010). But this tactic is not without limitations, as when small-
scale protests adopted violence in their protests, the odds of these protests succeeding did not 
increase, “on the contrary, the use of violence tends to be counterproductive” (Cai, 2010:135). 
This is because violence is tolerated less by local governments. Yang’s (2016) study also 
discussed the role of violence in the outcome of protests. He argued that violence is more likely 
to occur in “half-open” issues, such as land protests, than in open issues, such as environmental 
protests and “closed issues,” such as separatist protests. He argued that “violence in protests is 
an effective strategy for expanding existing political opportunities by gaining leverage over 
local officials” (Yang, 2016:2190). At the same time, he also contended that “violence is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for large-scale nonenvironmental protests’ success” (Yang, 
2016:2190). Chen’s (2009, 2012) work also explored the role violence in protests. He argued 
that the cadre evaluation system in China encouraged troublemaking and, in some 
circumstances, extreme tactics. He contended that “the statistical study confirms that disruption, 
publicity, and event size all positively affect the likelihood of a substantial government 
response” (Chen, 2012). Therefore, we can conclude that violence (in Chen’s words: disruptive 
tactics or troublemaking strategies) is an effective way to achieve the goals of protests. 
        But what about land protests? Can these findings be applied to China’s land protests? 
What is the role of violence in land protests? What is the role of media in land protests? These 
questions have not been systemically examined so far by scholars in relation to land protests in 
China since the Wukan Protest, and this topic deserves to be explored. Although some research 
studies focused on land protests in China, such as Lie (2014), there have been no comparable 
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case studies on land protests in China since the Wukan Protest. This is the academic void that 
this research attempts to fill. 
1.6 Research method 
This research will provide a comparison of five large-scale land protests that took place in 
China between 2012 and 2017. As such, it covers land protests in the “new era” since the 2011 
Wukan Incident.  
        This research focuses on China because it is the most powerful authoritarian regime on 
the planet. The country’s land ownership policy is also unique14 and is expected to affect 
China’s land protests. As such, protests are a sensitive topic in China, especially in today’s 
atmosphere.15 But we need to understand this regime and unpack its political system, as many 
scholars have asserted that China’s political system is non-monolithic. Therefore, in terms of 
land protests, different levels of government may respond to protests differently. China’s case 
will contribute to our understanding of contentious politics, and we will have a better 
understanding of the nature of China’s non-monolithic political system.  
        While investigating five cases cannot reflect the whole “view” of China’s land protests, 
these five cases do represent the most influential land protests since the Wukan Incident, and 
they represent all instances of the large-scale protests that happened in China during this period. 
Comparing these cases will allow me to find the differences between these cases and to narrow 
down the key factors that determined the final outcome.  
        More specifically, I will use Most Similar System Design (MSSD)16 to achieve that goal. 
MSSD consists of very similar cases that only differ in the dependent variable, as it is assumed 
that this would make it easier to find independent variables that could explain the 
 
14 For a more detailed introduction on China’s land ownership system, see Ho (2005). 
15 See Shambaugh (2016, p115-124). 
16 For good examples of applying the MSSD approach in comparative research, see Côté and Mitchell 
(2016) and Hurst (2009). 
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presence/absence of the dependent variable. In a basic sense, MSSD starts out with similar 
variables between subjects and tries to determine why the outcome is different between the 
subjects. My five cases fit the requirements of the MSSD method: they are all large-scale land 
protests in China, and all happened between 2012 and 2017,17 a very short time period. But the 
outcomes varied; for example, the Jinning Incident (2014) and Shangpu Incident (2013) were 
successful land protests, while the Liantang Incident (2014) was a failed land protest. So, using 
MSSD will help identify which factor or factors contributed to the different outcomes of land 
protests that happened over a short time period. Focusing on several cases of comparable size 
will allow me to develop a more nuanced theory about why some land protests in China 
succeeded while others failed. 
        I conducted a media analysis. Following Yang (2016) study, I used LexisNexis to search 
for how many large-scale protests had been reported in recent years. Using the search term 
“protest” and the five villages’ names in the LexisNexis database, I collected 53 international 
news articles on the five land protests that occurred between January 1, 2012 and December 
31, 2017.18 The LexisNexis database includes various types of renowned mainstream media 
 
17 When I was doing my field work in January and February 2019, the Tianmu protest was still on-
going but on a small-scale level, as everyday, about twenty to thirty villagers, mostly elders, went to 
protest at an intersection. So, technically speaking, the Tianmu case is not finished yet, but because 
this research set a line at December 31, 2017, events that happened after that time were not the focus 
of this research; sometimes, however, short descriptions of events that happened after December 31, 
2017 are given to make the story more complete. 
18 First, I followed Yang’s (2016) method. I searched “China” and “protest” in the LexisNexis 
database between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2017. I collected 40 cases that belong to large-
scale protests, including the five large-scale land protests in this research. Then, I searched “protest” 
and each village’s name in the LexisNexis database, and in total I collected 53 international media 
reports on these five cases. It is highly possible that these five cases were not all the large-scale lands 
protests that happened in China during this period and were reported on by international media. There 
are more cases that were reported on by international media during this period, but possibly because 
the title or body of that report did not include the word “protest”, or “China” or the report did not 
mention how many people were involved in the protest, so the case was not included in my dataset. 
Such cases include but are not limited to the Wanggang protest, Xishuangbanna protest, and Panhe 
protest. See (Hess, 2015, 200-201). Because of the limitation of my research method, it is almost 
impossible to include all cases that meet the threshold to be included in my dataset. But it is fair to say 
that those five cases were reported on by at least two English-language international media outlets, 
and therefore they are the most influential, by international standards, large-scale land protests that 
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from different countries, such as The New York Times, Washington Post, South China Moring 
Post, The Telegraph, Sydney Herald, The National Post, BBC, CNN and so on. I cross-checked 
the facts of each case to make sure they were supported by at least two reliable news sources, 
reducing the problem of bias produced by a single news report. A second database I used in 
this study is WiseNews, which includes overseas Chinese newspapers like RFA (Radio Free 
Asia), The Epoch Times, Boxun News, BBC Chinese, RFI (Radio France Internationale), VOA 
(Voice of America), DW (Deutsche Welle), and so on. WiseNews also includes Chinese 
newspapers and websites. I used WiseNews to search for Chinese language news reports from 
either domestic media or international news outlets. In total, I collected 126 domestic media 
reports on these five cases. 
        In addition to conducting a media analysis, I performed ethnographic fieldwork. 
Performing fieldwork allowed me to get more detailed information about these protests, as 
information on many of them could not be obtained only from media reports. Given the 
resources available, I did fieldwork on four cases: the Guangji Incident (2013), Liantang 
Incident (2014), Jinning Incident (2014), and Tianmu Protest (2015).19 These four protests had 
different outcomes: the Guangji Incident and Jinning Incident were successful land protests, 
while the Liantang Incident and Tianmu Incident were not successful. Focusing on these four 
cases will allow me to reveal the dynamics of these protests in more detail. I interviewed protest 
participants, protest organizers or leaders and general rural residents. When necessary, I also 
interviewed local government officials, because the perspective from the local government 
sometimes is also necessary for us to depict the whole picture of these protests.  
 
happened in China between 2012 and 2017. As the Tianmu case shows, it is impossible to include all 
large-scale land protests in China in this research because many protests were not reported on by 
either domestic media (i.e. the Tianmu case), or international media (i.e. the Qingliang case). For 
more on the Qingliang case, see (Xin, 2017). 
19 I did not do fieldwork on the Shangpu case (2013) because it resembles the Fuyou case in a number 
of ways: i.e. both cases were violent and succeeded in the end. This allowed me to focus on cases that 
varied in their independent or dependent variables. 
 
  13 
1.7 The organization of this thesis 
The first chapter introduces the research question: Why do some land protests in China succeed 
while others fail? I argue that large-scale land protests are more likely to succeed under three 
conditions: (1) when domestic media reports are supportive or on the villagers’ side (2) when 
land protests become violent and (3) when the protests occur at the early stage of the project 
that is occupying villagers’ lands.  
        Chapter Two provides a detailed literature review. It begins with a brief introduction of 
the Wukan Protest. Then, it moves on to discuss existing scholarship on factors that may 
influence the outcome of protests in China (either protests in general or a particular type of 
protest). Then, I will explain why I chose certain variables but not others in my research. The 
last part will reintroduce my own hypotheses. 
        Chapter Three will review my research methods and the types of data collected. The two 
research methods this research will use are media analysis and qualitative comparative analysis 
based on fieldwork. Media analysis will allow the collection of data from both domestic media 
and international media reports on China’s land protests since 2010. Then, doing fieldwork will 
allow me to gather more detailed and nuanced information about these land protests that I could 
not get only from media reports.  
        Chapter Four will briefly introduce these five cases; it will describe the background of 
these cases, how they have evolved, the main events of each case, and the outcome of each 
case. Chapters five to seven will present the empirical analysis. Each individual chapter will 
focus on a single hypothesis. I will use data collected from my media reports and fieldwork to 
test these hypotheses. Chapter Five will focus on the role of domestic media, Chapter Six will 
focus on the role of violence, and Chapter Seven will focus on the role of the timing of the 
protest.  
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         The last chapter is the conclusion. This part will briefly summarize the main findings of 
this research. What has this research contributed to the field of contentious politics? Can these 
findings be applied to other contexts, such as democratic regimes or other authoritarian regimes? 
What are the limitations of this research? How can they be remedied? What should future 
research focus on to better understand China’s land protests? 
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
After Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 “Southern Tour,” China entered a new booming cycle. As China’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) experienced a continually rapid increase, China replaced Japan 
as the second largest economy in the world in 2010. But, internally, China also entered a 
“contentious period.” As mentioned in the first chapter, China witnessed an exponential 
increase in the number of protests and mass incidents occurring throughout the nation since the 
1990s. Different groups stood up and waged protests, including peasants, workers, urban 
citizens, environmental pollution victims, migrant workers, homeowners, veterans, teachers, 
students, ethnic minorities, financial fraud victims and so on. But why did some protests 
succeed while others did not? Among them, land protests stand out as a particular protest type 
that has drawn both international and domestic attention. As China is still experiencing rapid 
urbanization, it is possible that land protests will persist in China for a long period. So, studying 
the mechanisms that affect the outcome of land protests in China has both theoretical and 
practical implications.  
          This chapter will first introduce what is perhaps the most famous land protest that 
occurred in China after the Tiananmen Massacre—the Wukan Protest. There are several 
reasons why covering this case is important for any investigation of land protests in China. 
First, it is one of the biggest and most famous land protests that happened in China in the last 
two decades. What is more, it achieved its goals, at least initially. For this reason, several 
studies on land protest dynamics in China used the Wukan protests as their case study. Finally, 
the Wukan protest is the reason why I became interested, as a graduate student, in the study of 
protests in China.  
        After introducing the Wukan Protest, I will review the literature examining the outcomes 
of protests in China, covering both general protests and particular types of protests (e.g., 
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environmental protests, worker protests and so on). Finally, based on existing scholarship, I 
will provide my own hypotheses on why some land protests in China succeeded while others 
failed.  
2.2 Wukan Protest 
The most famous land protest that happened in China in the recent decade was the “Wukan 
Incident,” which occurred in 2011. Wukan is located in Guangdong province, which was the 
forerunner of China’s reform and opening-up that started in 1978. Because of its proximity to 
Hong Kong, many foreign journalists were stationed there. When four thousand villagers in 
Wukan started to protest in front of the Lufeng City20 compound on September 21, 2011 
because their lands had been sold to developers without their consent and with no compensation, 
their protest drew international attention.21 
        This protest escalated after November 13, 2011, when a protest representative, Xue Jinbo, 
was killed while in custody. After this event, a series of protests were organized by Wukan 
villagers. On November 18, 2011, Wukan was cut off from the outside world. Villagers erected 
barricades on the roads to Wukan, and outsiders were not allowed to enter this village: only 
foreign journalists were permitted entry. The standoff between the villagers and authorities last 
one month. How things would play out became uncertain, and there was a lot of speculation 
from different media outlets. 
        The timing of this protest was notable: it took place just one year before the 18th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which takes place every five years, and the 
party secretary of Guangdong, Wang Yang, was expected to enter the Politburo Standing 
 
20 Lufeng City is a county-level city. In China, there are municipality-level cities, sub-provincial 
cities, vice-provincial cities, prefecture-level cities, county-level cities and township-level cities, 
though the last type is only a recent phenomenon in China. 
21 This case was mainly based on Lie’s (2014) account and Zhang and Lu (2011), Zhang (2011a), 
Zhang (2011b), and Zhang (2011c). 
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Committee of the CPC22  after this meeting. Consequently, how he handled this protest would 
affect his political fate. He dispatched Zhu Mingguo, the then-deputy party secretary of 
Guangdong province, to have a dialogue with representatives of the protesters. Zhu promised 
to let these villagers elect their village committee members for the first time in four decades, 
and he also promised to handle the land issue properly. The protest lost its momentum after 
this meeting. 
         In the first year after this protest, things went smoothly for the Wukan villagers, and they 
elected their village committee members. Unsurprisingly, all seven new village committee 
members were former protest leaders. Lin Zuluan, a critical person in this protest, was elected 
as both village head and party secretary of Wukan.23 
         At that time, both international and domestic media praised this as a success for the 
Wukan villagers and as a model for other villages to follow (Lau, 2012a; Lau, 2012b; Wines, 
2011; Wen, 2012; Zhu, 2012). Scholars have also treated Wukan as a successful land protest 
in China (Lu, Zhang & Wang, 2017; Hua, Hou, & Deng, 2016; Ren, 2017; He & Xue, 2014; 
Hess, 2014). 
        Things in Wukan, however, have turned sour since 2014.24 Since 2014, several protest 
leaders have been arrested by local authorities. Some of them fled from Wukan fearing they 
will be caught by the local authorities, including one couple who fled to the United States of 
America (USA).25 Since 2016, the situation has become worse:  Lin Zuluan was arrested and 
then sentenced to 37 months in prison. Another nine protest leaders were also arrested and 
 
22 Actually, Wang Yang did not enter the Politburo of Standing Committee of CPC in 2012. He 
became a member of Politburo of Standing Committee of CPC five years later, in 2017, on the 19th 
National Party Congress. 
23 For a detailed description of this protest, see Lie (2014: 17-23). 
24 After CPC’s 18th National Party Congress, Wang Yang was promoted as vice prime minister of 
State Council. Hu Chunhua, a member of Tuanpai or Youth League Faction took over Wang Yang’s 
position as party secretary of Guangdong province. Wang Yang is also a member of Tuanpai. On 
China’s elite politics and factions among top CPC leaders see Li (2016), especially chapter 7. 
25 They are Zhuang Liehong and his wife. 
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sentenced to up to 10 years in prison (Blanchard, 2016). Since then, Wukan has been under the 
surveillance of local authorities.26 It may have been fair to say in 2012 that Wukan represented 
a successful land protest, but it is hard to do the same now. 
        Why then, was Wukan a successful land protest, at least between 2012 and 2014? What 
factors contributed to this outcome? Can this case be supported by existing scholarship? 
Examining this particular case will help us understand existing scholarship on different 
variables that may increase the likelihood of a protest succeeding.  
2.3 Why do some protests succeed but others fail? 
In the last decade, scholars have examined different factors that may have influenced the 
outcome of protests that happened in China. Some of them focused on general protests, such 
as Cai (2010), Yang (2016), and Chen (2009, 2012). Some of them focused on a particular type 
of protest, such as environmental protests (Li, 2016; Deng, 2010, 2016; Deng and Yang 2013; 
Li et al., 2016), home-demolition protests (Huang et al., 2016) or land protests (Lie, 2014). 
What are their findings? Can their findings also be applied to land protests in China? In this 
section, I will explore the role of issue opportunity structure, state capacity, the role of social 
media, issue linkages, the size of protests and the role of the central and provincial governments, 
before indicating why these factors are not expected to play an important role in affecting recent 
land protest outcomes in China. Then, I will investigate in greater detail the role of domestic 
media, the role of violence, and the role of timing (of the protest), which will form the basis 
for my hypotheses. 
 
26 Online communication with Zhuang Leihong, September 2018. 
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2.4 Issue opportunity structure 
Yunkang Yang (2016) focuses on large-scale protests. By analyzing 26 large-scale protests that 
happened from 2011 to 2013 that were reported on by mainstream English newspapers, he 
found that “issue opportunity structure” is the most important factor that shapes the outcome 
of large-scale protests in China. He argues that environmental protests are more likely to be 
tolerated by China’s governments. Therefore, they have a better chance to succeed when a 
group of people are protesting against environmental issues. But if protestors are taking up 
other issues such as political rights or workers’ rights,27 the likelihood of success is much lower. 
This is because the opportunity structure that exists for environmental issues does not exist for 
these more “sensitive” issues. This is also due to the nature of an authoritarian regime; the 
ruling party or leaders do not want other forces to challenge their power in controlling society. 
Therefore, he distinguished “open opportunity structure,” such as environmental protests, 
“half-open opportunity structure,” such as land protests, and “closed issues,” such as 
secessionism and freedom of speech. However, relying on issue opportunity structure is not 
appropriate for answering my research question because, as Yang (2016) points out, land 
protests belong to a “half-open” structure, so this theory cannot explain why some land protests 
in China succeed while others fail.   
2.5 The role of “state capacity” 
Based on six case studies, which consist of three environmental protests and three social riots,28 
Xiaojun Yan and Kai Zhou (2017) found that “disparities in state capacity29 noticeably affect 
 
27 In his article, Yang (2016) included “freedom of speech” and “Tibetan independence” as closed 
structure and labor rights issues as “increasingly closed structure.” See Yang (2016:2908). 
28 Three environmental protests were: the Dongyang protest (2005), also called the Huaxi protest, the 
Xiamen protest (2007), and the Shanghai Anti-MagLev Railway Project protest (2008). Three social 
riots were the Weng’an protest (2008), Shenzhen protest (2008), and Shishou protest (2009). 
29 State capacity includes fiscal capacity, coercive capacity, and institutional capacity. 
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the trajectories of contentious collective actions and shape government responses in China” 
(Yan and Zhou, 2017:67). Specifically, they found that when local governments have more 
state capacity in their control, for example, if there are more monetary resources controlled by 
local governments, such as that of Shenzhen, the government will be more likely to 
compromise and employ nonviolent or peaceful resolutions in response to collective actions 
such as protests. But in cases when local governments have no such resources, the local 
government will be more likely to use repression to contain protests. In other words, under the 
former condition, protests are more likely to succeed, while under the latter situation, protests 
are more likely to fail. 
        However, many land protests took place in the most economically developed provinces in 
China. Among the six large-scale land protests that happened in China during 2010 to 2017, 
four of them were located in Guangdong province, which is one of the most prosperous 
provinces in China, so the “state capacity” of these places was much higher than in places like 
Jinning in Yunnan province. Yet, only two of the four protests in Guangdong succeeded (the 
Wukan Protest before 2014 and Shangpu Protest) while the Jinning Protest, which happened 
in a low “state capacity” region, succeeded. So, this framework cannot be applied to land 
protests that happened in China.  
2.6 The role of social media  
Since entering the new century, the Internet has become an indispensable part of life in China.30 
At the same time, social media has also entered people’s lives. For example, as of March 2018, 
Sina Weibo, one of China’s most popular social media platforms, had 411 million monthly-
active members, and it became the seventh platform in the world that passed 400 million active 
 
30 China has the largest online population in the world. As of June 30, 2019, 854 million Chinese have 
access to the Internet (CNNIC, 2019). 
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members (Sina, 2018). As was the case in other societies, such as the Jasmine Revolution in 
Tunisia, social media played an important role in affecting the outcome of protests. 
        Yang (2016) argues that when protesters used social media as an organizational tool rather 
than as just a “pick-up” tool, the possibilities for a particular protest to succeed were higher. 
More specifically, if protesters used social media to organize and mobilize others to join in 
their cause, such as what Wukan’s young generation did in the Wukan Incident, then social 
media played a role as an organizational tool. But when protesters only used social media to 
disseminate the outbreak of a protest, then social media only played the role of a “pick-up” 
tool. He contends that when the first “function” is used, the likelihood for a protest to succeed 
is higher. However, when social media is only used as “pick-up” tool, then the odds of success 
are lower. Lei’s (2014) research also emphasizes the role of social media in determining the 
outcome of the Wukan Incident. In the same vein, Li (2016:206) also emphasized the role of 
social media in affecting the result of environmental protests.  
        As Lie (2014) has shown, social media played an important role in affecting the outcome 
of the Wukan Incident. Without the young generation so adeptly using social media platforms, 
such as QQ group, Twitter, and Weibo, and using documentary to disseminate information on 
the internet, the Wukan protest would not have drawn so much attention, either from domestic 
or international media. 
        However, not all protests rely on social media. Among the six land protest cases that took 
place from 2010 to 2017, 31  only in Wukan did the villagers use social media as an 
“organizational” tool, as the other five cases only used social media as a “pick-up” tool. Yet, 
the Jinning protest still succeeded, so it cannot be applied to this context.  
 
31 The sixth case is the Haosi protest. This occurred in 2011, so it is not included in this research, as 
this research mainly focused on large-scale land protests that happened between 2012 and 2017. 
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2.7 The role of “issue linkage” 
Cai (2010), Deng (2010, 2016), Deng and Yang (2013) emphasized the role of “issue linkage” 
in affecting the outcome of protests in China. 
        In his book, Cai (2010) argued that “Chinese citizens may improve their chance of success 
by exploiting the political space embedded in the political system with means that are 
acceptable to the state” (Cai, 2010:69). He found that some citizens increase their chance of 
success by applying multiple constraints on local officials. Issue linkage increases the risk to 
local officials who use or intend to use suppression against protesters. 
        His finding was in agreement with Deng (2010, 2016), Deng and Yang’s (2013) research. 
As the last chapter mentioned, Deng (2016) analyzes an environmental protest that happened 
at a village in Zhejiang province—the Huazhen protest. They argue that “protests based solely 
on environmental claims are often powerless, but the interlocking of different issues makes it 
possible for victims to address environmental grievances by piggybacking on other issues that 
present greater political opportunities” (Deng and Yang, 2013:334; Deng, 2010, 2016). As 
aforementioned, only using environmental language at that time (2005) would not have opened 
the political opportunity structure, so they piggybacked on the anti-corruption strategy together 
with environmental discourse to frame their grievance and therefore expand their “political 
opportunities structure.” They conclude that “the chances of environmental protest are 
contingent upon these other conditions and values” (Deng and Yang, 2013:334). My 
preliminary investigation showed that these six cases did not apply the “issue linkage” strategy 
in their protests; therefore, I will not focus on this variable.  
2.8 The size of protests 
Several scholars such as Cai (2010) and Li (2016), have focused on how the size of protests 
affects their outcome. 
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         In his book, Cai (2010) emphasizes the scale of protests in affecting the outcome of 
protests in China. He argues that compared to small-scale32 protests, large-scale protests are 
more likely to succeed, as large-scale protests are more likely to be noticed by the central 
government and pose more of a challenge for societal stability, and hence the central 
government is more likely to intervene. 
        In his dissertation, Li (2016) proposes that “local government tends to adopt a tension 
reduction or a giving in strategy to when the scale of protests is large.33 However, local 
governments tend to apply a go-alone or suppression strategy when protests are small scale” 
(Li, 2016: 207). After investigating ten environmental protests and using comparative case 
studies, he then reformulates his proposition to “The scale of protests is not crucial in 
explaining the patterns of government strategies” (Li, 2016:207). After using the crisp-set 
qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA) method to investigate the same ten environmental 
protests, he then further redeveloped his proposition to “Large-scale or small-scale protests, 
combined with other conditions, can result in government compromises” (Li, 2016:207). Thus, 
he concludes that “this conclusion is not in line with the conclusion drawn by Cai (2010), who 
argues the scale of protest played a crucially important role in shaping government decisions 
in social conflicts” (Li, 2016:205). 
        The size of protests is not an appropriate factor that may affect the outcome of land 
protests in China because in Cai’s (2010) standard, all these cases are large-scale protests, but, 
as has been previously established, the outcomes varied. Moreover, Li (2016) already found 
that the scale of protests is not as important as Cai (2010) indicated in his research. 
Consequently, this variable will not be included in my hypotheses. 
 
32 A small-scale protest means that a protest has less than five hundred participants. 
33 The threshold for large-scale protests in Li’s (2016) dissertation is a little vague, as he did not 
define what is a large-scale protest in Chapter 3 when he introduced his original propositions, but in 
Chapter 8 he defined a large-scale protest as having at least 5,000 participants. See Li (2016:179). 
Thus, his standard is different from Cai’s (2010) definition. 
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2.9 The role of the central government or provincial government 
Cai (2010) focuses on the role of upper-level government intervention, especially that of central 
or provincial governments. Cai bases his theory on rational theory and assumed China’s 
authorities are calculating costs and benefits when they are making decisions on how to respond 
to protesters’ actions. He argues that protesters’ success hinges on central or provincial 
governments’ intervention. Therefore, protesters’ strategies should focus on how to prompt the 
central government and provincial government to “step in.” He contends that “forceful” 
protests are more likely to be intervened in by the central or provincial government. 
        Using the csQCA method, Yanwei Li, Joop Koppenjan and Stefan Verweij (2016) and Li 
(2016) focus on environmental protests, especially high-profile protests against incinerators 
and paraxylene (PX) plants. Through investigating ten high-profile environmental protests that 
occurred from 2006 to 2013, they identify one necessary condition and three sufficient paths 
that can explain why local governments choose to compromise or, in their words, “occurrence 
of decision changes.” They find that the central government’s attitude is critical when local 
governments make decisions on whether or not to compromise when facing challenges from 
society, especially, in this case, during environmental protests. In his dissertation, Li (2016) 
concludes that “the position of the higher-level government is the most important condition in 
explaining the application of government strategies during environment conflicts” (Li, 
2016:202). 
        Using a similar method (fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis or fsQCA), Ronggui 
Huang, Wen Zheng and Yong Gui (2016) investigate 40 anti-demolition protests based on 
information they collected from China’s newspapers from 2003 to 2012. Their findings are 
similar to Yanwei Li et al.’s conclusions. They argue that the “co-presence of central 
government intervention and supportive reports from central state-sponsored media” is a 
sufficient condition for protest success. They refer to these two factors as “multi-channeled 
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forceful intervention.” They also point out that this phenomenon depended on a favorable 
institutional environment and the challengers’ strategic use of different frames such as the 
socialist frame or collective frame. Their findings are also substantiated by the Wukan case, 
because when the provincial government “stepped in” on December 22, 2011, the Wukan 
protest finally diminished. 
        However, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether or not the central government or 
provincial government has intervened in a particular protest because the domestic media may 
not disclose this information in their reports. Thus, it is difficult for an outsider to determine 
whether or not a high level of government has intervened in a protest. Secondly, from the 
information I have gathered, neither the central government,34 nor the provincial government 
interevened in the Shangpu case; nevertheless, it succeeded in the end. Therefore, the role of 
the central government and provincial government can not be used to explain the outcomes of 
these five cases. 
2.10 The role of traditional media  
Unlike in democratic countries where media is the “fourth pillar” of society and freedom of the 
press exists, media in China is under strict control by party departments, such as the propaganda 
department or publicity department. But during the last two decades, China’s media 
experienced a process of marketization. As Mertha (2008) puts it: 
        This in turn, has been reinforced by a Chinese media increasingly required to generate its        
own budgetary revenue. As a result, it must rely on advertisers who will not pay for ad 
space if people do not consume said media. To ensure that people do so, there has been a 
 
34 After the second clash happened on March 10, 2013, the Publicity Department issued a report ban 
for domestic media on this event, so it is still hard to decide whether or not the central government 
and provincial government directly interevened in this protest. 
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dramatic increase in the proportion of tabloid journalism stories that, in addition to racy 
sex stories, covering government injustice, civil protest, and the like. (Mertha, 2008:10) 
        During this period, some media have been more likely to report on controversial issues, 
such as protests. There are a lot of consumer-driven media in China now such as Southern 
Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo), Finance (Caijing), Caixin Weekly (Caixin Zhoukan), Phoenix Weekly 
(Fenghuang Zhoukan), The Beijing News (Xinjingbao), Nanfang Metropolis Daily (Nanfang 
Dushibao), 21st Century Business Herald (Eshiyi Shiji Jingji Baodao), The Economic Observer (Jingji 
Guanchabao) and so on. Among directly state owned or controlled media, China Youth Daily35 
(Zhongguo Qingnianbao) stood out for its brave and often critical attitude toward 
governments.36 In general, there are two distinct types of domestic media in China. One is 
under the direct control by the government or CCP propaganda department or government-
supported media, i.e., the People’s Daily, Guangming Daily, Farmers’ Daily, Workers’ Daily, etc., and 
the other  is consumer-oriented media outlets, i.e., Caixin Magazine, Southern Weekly, the Beijing 
News, Phenix Weekly37, Nanfang Metropolis Daily, etc. But even the consumer-oriented domestic 
media also need to abide by the CCP propaganda department’s orders.  Still, compared to the 
former ones, consumer-oriented domestic media outlets are more likely to report controversial 
issues/topics, especially in the early years of the Xi Jinping era. But sometimes, there is no 
clear-cut line between government-sponsored domestic media outlets and consumer-oriented 
domestic media outlets. For instance, the Global Times is a domestic media outlet that is 
 
35 China Youth Daily is directly controlled by the China Youth League Central Committee, one of the 
national-level newspapers controlled by the communist party. 
36 For a more detailed description on China’s media transformation in the last two decades, see Lynch 
(1999), Shirk (2011) and Donald et al. (2013). 
37 Because the Phenix Weekly likes to report controversial and important issues, so even though it is 
granted to publish within mainland China, many/some provincial governments prohibit it be 
circulated within its jurisdiction. For example, when I was studying at Nankai University in Tianjin 
Municipality between 2011 to 2013, I noticed that it is illegal to sell that magazine in the bookstores, 
and this was the Tianjin Municipality's dictate. 
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controlled by the People’s Daily, but at the same time, it is also a consumer-oriented domestic 
media outlet, famous for igniting nationalistic sentiment in mainland China. 
        There are three strands of thought on how media influence the attitude of the central 
government on protests that happen in China. The first is represented by Mertha (2008). As he 
puts it,  
China’s leadership’s primary constituency is its domestic one. That is to say, the leadership 
in Zhongnanhai pays attention to reports of ‘public opinion,’ as measured indirectly by 
what the media produces—a premise that assumes the media to be increasingly consumer-
driven, which is the case. Thus, an important proxy measure of public opinion in China is 
the amount of media coverage on a given issue. (Mertha, 2008:108) 
        Thus, in Mertha’s opinion, Chinese media reports on protests serve as a proxy of “public 
opinion”, and the central government will treat those reports seriously if there are enough 
reports on a particular issue or protest. Therefore, if media reports side with one side, for 
example the protesters’ side, then the central government will choose to intervene in this protest. 
        The second strand of thought is represented by Li (2016). As mentioned earlier, he treats 
the national mass media (such as People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency, or CCTV38) as an 
extension of the central government. Consequently, the attitude they display reflects the 
attitude of the central government. In this case, if the national mass media’s attitude on a 
particular protest is negative, then the local government will compromise with protesters. If the 
attitude of the national mass media is supportive, then the local government will not 
compromise with protesters and will continue their projects. 
        The third strand of thought is represented by Cai (2010). Cai divided China’s governments 
into the central government and local governments. Compared to local governments, the central 
 
38 These three national mass media outlets are on a bureaucratic level, as both People’s Daily and 
Xinhua News Agency are minister-level entities, while CCTV is a vice-minister-level entity. 
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government pays more attention to legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. So, if negative reports 
about a protest appear on China’s media, the central government will face the risk of losing its 
legitimacy in the eyes of Chinese citizens if they do not intervene in this protest. Therefore, 
media reports, especially negative reports, will induce the central government to choose to 
intervene in a protest.  
        Some scholars have looked into the role of media in affecting the outcome of protests in 
China, such as Cai (2010), O’Brien and Li (2006), Bernstein and Lü (2003), Mertha (2008), 
and Li (2016). 
        Media played an important role in environmental protests. In his book on China’s anti-
dam protests, Mertha (2008) finds that media and journalists are important forces that advocate 
for environmental protection, in this case, through anti-dam protests, such as the dams 
supposed to be built on the Nu River (also, Sun and Zhao, 2008) and Dujiangyan Project. In 
the Dujiangyan case, the media is an important ally of the Dujiangyan Cultural Relic Bureau 
(CRB), the Dujiangyan World Heritage Office, the Dujiangyan Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), the Dujiangyan Seismological Bureau, and the generalists in the Dujiangyan 
municipal government against the Sichuan provincial government. “Around 180 media outlets, 
newspapers, magazine, and TV and radio stations reported on the controversy, and almost all 
of them sided with the opposition” (Mertha, 2008:106). Strictly speaking, this is not an 
environmental protest waged by ordinary citizens, but rather an “environmental policy” 
struggle between different government agents or different levels of government. However, 
citizens around this dam who need to resettle (yimin) are also important stakeholders in this 
case, and they usually did not get enough compensation for losing their lands and homes. Thus, 
successfully altering the “trajectory” of the Dujiangyan (Yangliuhu) project will also benefit 
those who may need to resettle due to this project. In the Nu River case, because ofcontinual 
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and critical domestic media reports, this dam was suspended by the Wen Jiabao administration 
in 2004 (Mertha, 2008). 39  
         In his dissertation, Li (2016) proposes that “When the national media criticizes existing 
government strategies, local governments tend to apply a tension reduction, a giving in, a 
collaboration, or a facilitation strategy. However, when they support government strategies, 
local governments tend to adopt a go-alone or a suppression strategy” (Li, 2016: 208). After 
investigating ten environmental protests and using comparative case studies, he then 
redevelops his proposition to “the absence of support from national mass media is important in 
explaining project cancellation and project relocation” (Li, 2016:208). After using the csQCA 
method to investigate the same ten environmental protests, he further reformulates his 
proposition to “The absence of support from the central government (including the national 
mass media) contributes to government compromises. Its presences (including from the 
national mass media) contributes to the absence of government compromises” (Li, 2016:208) 
as he treats the national mass media (such as People’s Daily, Xinhua News, or CCTV) as an 
extension of the central government. So, their attitude can also reflect the attitude of the central 
government. He concludes that “the position of the national mass media is important in 
explaining the application of government strategies” (Li, 2016:204). 
         Media also played an important role in affecting peasants’ protests. Media is an important 
ally for peasants when they are seeking support from the system, and media programs such as 
the CCTV’s famous “Focus Report” have often aired peasants’ grievances, especially during 
the Zhu Rongji era. Their supportive report helped peasants achieve their protest goals 
(O’Brien and Li, 2006; Bernstein and Lü, 2003; Yu, 2007; Cai, 2010). 
        It is true that international media can sometimes have an impact on the outcome of a 
protest as illustrated in the Wukan case (Hess, 2015). It his article, Hess built a four-level model 
 
39 These dams were revived by Yunnan provincial governments eight years later. See, Li (2013). 
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to show how protesters tried to use international media outlets as an ally to induce the provincial 
or central government to intervene on their behalf and get a favorable result. But the situation 
of those five cases is different from the famous Wukan case, though all six cases have been 
reported on by English-language international media outlets. The key difference lies in the 
intensity of the international media attention: the five cases covered by this research did not 
receive the same level of international media attention as the Wukan case. For example, we can 
find 1,341 media reports on the Wukan protest in LexisNexis between January 1, 2011 and 
December 31, 2012. But we can find only 19 international media reports on the Shangpu 
protest/incident between January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2014, which is the most international 
media exposure among the five cases investigated in this paper. Therefore, compared to the 
Wukan case, where the international media clearly played a role in influencing the outcome of 
that protest, the five cases this research focused on were more likely to be affected by traditional 
media or domestiac media. 
        Indeed, China’s domestic media does not enjoy “the freedom to report,” which Western 
media do. But to some extent, that they still have some space/freedom to report some 
controversial topics, such as some consumer-oriented domestic media outlets did in the early 
2010s in China, at the beginning of Xi Jinping’s reign, when the central government’s control 
over domestic media was not as tight as now. At that time, media framing is presumed to be at 
least somewhat (though perhaps not completely) independent from the government’s 
preferences. So, it is fair to say that during this period (2012-2017), domestic media coverage 
on some topics was independent of the government's preferences. I will further talk about this 
point in the Fuyou case later in Chapter five. 
Based on this literature, I propose my first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: If the domestic media reports on this protest are supportive or on the protesters’ 
side, then the likelihood of success is higher; if the domestic media reports are negative or on 
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the governments’ side or if there is no domestic media reports on this case, then the likelihood 
of success is lower. 
2.11 The role of violence 
Several studies have explored the role of violence in the outcome of protests (e.g., Cai 2008, 
2010; Yang 2016; and Chen 2009, 2012). As mentioned in Cai’s theory, to prompt the central 
or provincial government to intervene, when protesters exhausted other channels, they would 
use disruptive tactics such as violence to induce the upper-level government to “step in” (Cai, 
2010). Consequently, the role of violence in large-scale protests in assuring their success is 
evident. But this tactic is not without limitations: when a small-scale protest adopted violence, 
the odds of this protest succeeding did not increase, “on the contrary, the use of violence tends 
to be counterproductive” (Cai, 2010:135). This is because violence is not tolerated by the local 
governments.  
         A study by Yang (2016) also discusses the role of violence in the outcome of protests. 
He argued that violence is more likely to occur in “half-open” issues, such as land protests than 
in open issues, such as environmental protests and “closed issues,” such as separatist protests. 
He argues that “violence in protests is an effective strategy for expanding existing political 
opportunities by gaining leverage over local officials” (Yang, 2016:2190). But, at the same 
time, he also contends that “violence is a necessary but insufficient condition for large-scale 
nonenvironmental protests’ success” (Yang, 2016:2190). 
        Work conducted by Chen (2009, 2012) also explores the role of violence in protests. He 
argued that the cadre evaluation system in China encouraged troublemakers and, in some 
circumstances, extreme tactics. He claims that “the statistical study confirms that disruption, 
publicity, and event size all positively affect the likelihood of substantial government response” 
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(Chen, 2012:185). Therefore, we can conclude that violence (or in Chen’s words: disruptive 
tactics or troublemaking strategies) is an effective way to achieve protests goals. 
         In his doctoral dissertation, Li (2016) proposed that “local governments tend to apply a 
go-alone or suppression strategy to deal with peaceful protests, whereas they tend to apply a 
tension reduction or giving in strategy to cope with violent protests” (Li, 2016: 207). After 
investigating ten environmental protests, he then redevelops his proposition to “the occurrence 
of violent protest is important in explaining project cancellation. Its absence is important in 
explaining project continuation and project relocation” (Li, 2016:207). After using the csQCA 
method to investigate the same ten environmental protests, he then further reformulates his 
proposition to “the occurrence or the absence of violent protests, combined with other 
conditions, can lead to the occurrence of government compromises. The absence of violent 
protests contributes to the absence of government compromises” (Li, 2016:207). Thus, we can 
conclude that violence is an important factor that influences the decisions of government to 
make compromises when they are challenged by protesters. In his language, “the form of 
protest is the second most important condition in explaining the application of government 
strategies during environment conflicts” (Li, 2016:203). In the Wukan case, we can see the 
influence of violence because the protests in Wukan were very violent in September to 
December 2011 (Lie, 2014:17), after which the provincial government intervened. Based on 
this theoretical literature, I propose my second hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: The more violent a land protest, the higher the likelihood of success. In turn, 
the less violent a land protest, the less likely it is to succeed.  
2.12 The role of timing of the protest 
In his disseratation on China’s environmental protests, Li (2016) found that if a protest 
happened at the early stage of a development project, the local government was more likely to 
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adopt a “give in” or “tension reduction” strategy because invesments in the project were still 
low, which means that the protesters were more likely to win that protest. But, if a protest 
happened at the late stage of the developmental project, the local government was more likely 
to adopt a “suppression strategy” because the cost for the local government to give in was high 
at that point, which means the protesters were going to have a failing outcome. This analysis 
is based on a cost-benefit analysis from the viewpoint of the local government when an 
environmental protest occurred in China. Based on these insights, I propose my third 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: If a land protest happens at the early stage of a project, it is more likely to end 
with a successful result; if a land protest happens at the late stage of a project, it is more likely 
to end with a failed outcome.  
2.13 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I reviewed the literature on factors that have been identified by different 
scholars, such as the issue opportunity structure, state capacity, social media, issue linkage, and 
the size of protests and involvement of central and provincial governments, before rejecting 
them. Even though those factors may not be the necessary conditions for those five cases to 
succeed, because I am not 100 percent certain that those cases represent all the lar-scale land 
protests that happened in China during this period, so if more cases were added to the analysis, 
then some of those factors may become sufficient conditions for large-scale land protests in 
China to succeed. For the purpose of my research project, I focused on domestic media, the 
role of violence, and the role of the timing in affecting recent land protest outcomes. This 
chapter also introduced the famous Wukan Protest and explained why this protest was 
successful before 2014. 
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        The next chapter will focus on the research method that will be applied to my research, 
mostly, the media analysis and qualitative case study.  
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Chapter Three: Research Method 
In this chapter, I will describe the qualitative research methods applied in this research. More 
specifically, this research uses media analysis and comparative case studies drawn from two 
months of field work in China from Jaunuary 2019 to March 2019. I will demonstrate why 
these two methods combined will be appropriate to answer my research question. What are 
the advantages and challenges of these two research methods? 
3.1 Sub-national comparison 
It is true that China is a unitary government system, but many political scientists have pointed 
out that China’s political system is “fragmented”40 –i.e. that policies promulgated by the 
central government were applied by different local governments unevenly.41  Thus, to 
understand China as a whole, it is better to understand it from the perspective of sub-national-
level governments. As Hurst (2009) puts it incisively, 
Rather, Chinese politics bears a greater resemblance to a primitive particle accelerator, in 
which subnational units behave like particles moving in the national context of the 
accelerator. The shape of the accelerator and the general direction of the particles are 
controlled by the central state, but the behavior of each subnational unit is at least 
somewhat independent of the others. (Hurst, 2009:5) 
        Therefore, to understand how Chinese governments reacted to land protests, it is 
necessary to compare local governments from different provinces. As I mentioned in the first 
chapter, the five cases are located in three different provinces: Shangpu and Liantang are all 
 
40 “Fragmented authoritarianism” was first introduced by Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg 
in their book, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes, 1988. This framework has 
been applied by many scholars including Bernstein & Lü, O’Brien & Li (2006), Cai (2010), Chen 
(2012), Hurst (2009), Fu (2018) and Mertha (2008). 
41 China’s fragmented political system or “federalism, Chinese style” as Gabriella Montinola et al. call 
it, had been used to explain China’s economic success since 1978, see Gabriella Montinola et al. 
(1996). 
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situated in Guangdong province, Fuyou and Guangji are located in Yunnan province, and 
Tianmu is located in Tianjin municipality.42 Among these five cases, some accomplished 
their stated goals, while others did not. Table 3.1 shows some basic information on these five 
cases that I collected from performing the media analysis. 
Table 3.1 Summary table of protest cases 
Incident name43 Province Outcome Period Size 
Guangji Yunnan Success 12/26/2012–10/22/2013 1,000 
Fuyou Yunnan Success 3/28/2012–10/14/2014 2,000 
Shangpu Guangdong Success 2/22/2013–3/10/2013 3,500 
Liantang Guangdong Fail 10/25/2012–9/26/2014 3,000 
Tianmu Tianjin Fail 1/12/2015–1/30/2016 2,000 
 
        Investigating these five cases will allow me to use the Most Similar System Design 
(MSSD) to answer my research question because MSSD consists of very similar cases that 
only differ on the dependent variable based on the assumption that this would make it easier 
to find those independent variables that explain the presence/absence of the dependent 
variable. The reasons why these five cases are similar are fourfold. First, all five cases are 
large-scale protests (i.e. involved at least 500 people).44 Second, all these protests were 
triggered by land acquisition. Third, all these protests during at the same period, from 2012 to 
2017, meaning that their background environment such as land-related laws or regulations are 
the same. Fourth, the related laws regarding the ownership or exploitation of land are the 
same.  
 
42 China has four province-level municipalities: Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing. In total, 
China has twenty-three provinces (including Taiwan), five autonomous regions, four municipalities, 
and two special administrative regions. See China’s central government website: 
http://www.gov.cn/test/2005-06/15/content_18253.htm (accessed December 22, 2018). 
43 Liantang, Tianmu, Shangpu, Guangji and Fuyou are the names of the villages where the land 
protests happened. Jinning case and Fuyou case are used interchangeablely. 
44 The number of protesters for Liantang, Jinning, Tianmu, Shangpu and Guangji are 3,000, 2,000, 
2,000, 3,500 and 1,000 respectively. 
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        MSSD starts with similar variables between subjects and is used to determine why the 
outcome is different between the cases. This method has both advantages and disadvantages. 
The method of difference (MSSD) can be used to distinguish sufficient conditions (See Dion 
1998; Mahoney 1999). Moreover, the method of difference can help structure comparisons 
and can be used to confirm arguments (See Collier and Collier 1991; Skocpol 1979). The 
disadvantages of this method include its challenges in coping with the probabilistic 
perspective, data errors, multivariate analysis, and interaction effects (Lieberson 1991, 1994). 
This method also suffers from one serious practical shortcoming—there are a limited number 
of countries, and therefore it will never be possible to keep constant all potential explanatory 
factors (e.g. Meckstroth, 1975:134; Peters, 1998:38-39). But, overall, its advantages outweigh 
its disadvantages. As Hurst (2009) puts it,  
Causal stories that produce divergent outcomes across regions can be more easily pinned 
down. Subnational comparison of this sort can be useful for creating bounded theories, 
specifying the antecedent conditions (background variables) required for these theories 
to operate, and providing some test of the necessity of these background conditions and 
thus estimating the scope of generalizability of the theories inferred. (Hurst, 2009:7) 
        Also, as Lijphart (1971) put it over forty years ago, “If such comparable cases can be 
found, they offer particularly good opportunities for the application of the comparative 
method because they allow the establishment of relationships among a few variables while 
many other variables are controlled” (Lijphart, 1971:687). Thus, the MSSD approach is an 
appropriate research method for this project. 
3.2 Media analysis 
The first method applied in this project is media analysis. Following Yang’s (2016) study, I 
used LexisNexis to search for large-scale protests that had been reported on in recent years. 
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Using the search terms “protest” and “China” in the LexisNexis database, I collected 4045 
relevant protest events from international media46 reports between 2012 and 2017,47 including 
five land protests: Shangpu (2013) and Liantang (2014) in Guangdong province, Guangji 
(2013) and Fuyou (2014) in Yunnan province, and Tianmu (2015) in Tianjin municipality.  
        The LexisNexis database includes various types of renowned mainstream media from 
different countries, such as The New York Times, Washington Post, South China Morning 
Post, The Telegraph, Sydney Herald, The National Post, BBC, CNN and so on. I cross-
checked the facts of each case to make sure they were supported by at least two reliable news 
sources, reducing the problem of bias produced by a single news report.  
        A second database I used in this study is WiseNews, which includes overseas Chinese 
newspapers or media like RFA (Radio Free Asia), The Epoch Times, Boxun News, BBC 
 
45 We should be aware that one media report does not equal one case/incident, as there are sometimes 
several media reports on one case. Thus, this number did not contradict the number shown in Table 
3.2.  
46 I used international media reports to narrow down my research focus, and those land protests that 
had been reported on by international media outlets can also reflect that those protests constitute the 
most influential land protests happening in China in recent years. Another reason for using 
international media instead of domestic media is because there is no comprehensive dataset that 
includes all of China’s domestic media outlets like that of LexisNexis, though Wisenews is close to 
LexisNexis. Constructing my own dataset would require a lot of resources, and as a master’s student I 
could not afford this.  
47 I encountered some challenges when deciding whether or not to include a particular case into my 
project. For example, in some media reports, journalists used vague words such as “hundreds of 
people participated in this protest”, which, in this case, will not be included in my dataset. To meet the 
standard of “large-scale,” it has to meet the five hundred participant threshold; however, words such 
as “hundreds” are too vague to determine the specific number of participants in this protest. 
Therefore, cases like these were excluded from my dataset. 
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Chinese, RFI (Radio France Internationale), VOA (Voice of America), DW (Deutsche 
Welle),48 and so on. WiseNews also includes Chinese newspapers and websites.49 
        In total, I collected 244 original media reports on these five cases, as shown in Table 3.2 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 A problem with domestic media like the People’s Daily or Xinhua News Agency and others—all of 
which are controlled by the communist party—is that they often either do not report protests that 
happened in China or under-report the number of those who participated in these protests or how 
many people were injured in them. In contrast, overseas Chinese-language media like The Epoch 
Times, Boxun News and others often exaggerate the number of participants and people injured in these 
protests. This is because they usually base their reports on villagers’ accounts through phone 
interviews or from social media platforms and lack the capacity to verify villagers’ accounts. So, 
comparatively speaking, English mainstream media like The New York Times, BBC and others have 
the most reliable information about these protests because they spent a lot of resources on verifying 
journalists’ reports. But a limitation is that most international media do not have the financial 
resources to have regular journalists stationed in China. This is also the reason why most English-
international media reports on China’s protests were reported by The New York Times and South 
China Morning Post (SCMP). The former is the most famous English language media in the world, 
and it has the financial resources to have journalists stationed in China, mostly in Beijing. The latter 
one is the most reliable English language media outlet based in China, as it is based in Hong Kong, 
and it is not directly controlled by the communist party like the Global Times and the China Daily. 
The current owner of SCMP is Ma Yun, the founder of Alibaba and one of the richest people in 
China. However, it was recently revealed that Ma Yun is a communist party member. 
49 WiseNews (Huike) is a Chinese-language news dataset like its English counterpart, LexisNexis; 
it provides full-text articles from over 1,200 plus key newspapers and magazines, 10,000 plus 
websites, and 1,500 plus social media platforms from China, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and the 
United States. It is one of the most comprehensive Chinese-language news datasets in China. It is 
updated daily. 
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Table 3.2 Summary table of media analysis of five land protests 
Incident name Domestic media reports 
English-language 
international 
media reports 
Chinese-
language 
international 
media reports 
Total media 
reports 
Shangpu 7 1950 23 49 
Liantang 1351 752 16 36 
Guangji 6 5 4 15 
Fuyou 10053 14 8 122 
Tianmu 0 8 14 22 
 Total 126  53 65 244 
       
        From these media reports, I collected the following information: e.g., when these 
protests happened, how many people participated in these protests, whether they were violent 
or not, how many people were injured, how local governments reacted to these protests, the 
outcomes of these protests and so on. 
3.3 Fieldwork interview 
The second method of data collection applied in this research is fieldwork interviews. In the 
last two decades, as China has become more open to Western scholars, doing field work in 
China has become more and more accessible, and scholars have in turn used this method to 
collect original data to perform their research, such as Bernstein and Lü (2003), O’Brien and 
Li (2006), Lee (2007), Lu (2008), Mertha (2008), Hurst (2009), Cai (2010), Deng (2010, 
2016), Chen (2012), Côté (2014), Li (2016), and Fu (2018). 
 
50 Two English-language international media reports are from China Daily. China Daily is an English-
language daily newspaper owned by the Publicity Department of the CPC and published in the PRC. 
51 There are at least 92 domestic media outlets or websites that reproduced these thirteen original 
media reports. Many of these media reports or websites have been censored by the state and cannot be 
opened now, even though they just reproduced the official account of this protest/case. 
52 One English-language international media report is from the Global Times, the English version of 
Huanqiu Shibao, one of China’s nationalist media outlets administered by People’s Daily, but it is 
“consumer oriented.” 
53 There are hundreds of domestic media outlets or websites that reproduced these fifty-seven original 
media reports or commentaries about this protest. It was the deadliest land protest that happened in 
China since the Dingzhou Protest, which happened in 2005. 
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        I conducted field work for approximately one week in four of these five sites of study 
(i.e., Liantang, Fuyou/Jinning, Guangji and Tianmu) to allow for a series of in-depth, 
personal, open-ended interviews. The four cases were decided based on the MSSD, as they 
show substantial similarities, yet they reached different outcomes.  
        I spoke to two types of members from the local community: 1) public personalities (e.g. 
local scholars, group leaders, and representatives of NGOs, etc.), and 2) members of the 
broader population (e.g. teachers, farmers and salespersons), especially protest leaders. The 
rationale for interviewing participants from these two categories can easily be explained. 
Interviewing public personalities helped clarify the nature of some events/conflicts. It also 
provided me with some material for understanding the socio-economic context of land 
protests while furthering my understanding of the state’s perception of land protests. On the 
flip side, though, this group is, as a whole, expected to tow the party or the state’s line the 
most (though there would clearly be exceptions to this general remark, e.g. religious leaders 
and NGOs). Interviewing members of the broader population, in contrast, teased out more 
unexpected findings, such as individual motivations for participating in the protests as well as 
individual recollections of events. Speaking with protest leaders gave me more detail on what 
the protest involved and how it progressed, and I learned much inside information about these 
protests that I could not get from either media analysis or online information.  
        Whenever possible, I randomly recruited participants in order to account for possible 
bias in gender, age and place of residency.  I first started by initiating contact with potential 
participants via social media and blogs prior to my arrival in China, a common research 
strategy. Indeed, all of my case studies have been covered and discussed in social media in 
China, and other scholars, e.g. Lu Yuyu and Li Tingyu, have also collected protests data from 
social media platforms (such as Sina Weibo and Tencent Weibo). I contacted some 
journalists who had reported on those cases (either domestically or internationally) and 
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therefore had some connections with that place and some protest leaders. Some of them 
replied to my message/emails and introduced me with some protest leaders’ contact 
information. I reached out to them before I went to China: some of them replied to me and 
agreed to accept my interview, others were  still in prison,  I also received help from my own 
network,  including from a former supervisor at a Chinese university,  who introduced me to 
one of his students, who happens to have connections with one of my fieldwork sites. Then, 
we set up a meeting in a restaurant, and they accepted my interview after we had dinner 
together, providing me with some valuable information from the perspective of local 
government, which help me to build a more comprehensive picture of that case. 
        In one case, I recruited participants as they were participating in a protest.  I went to the 
place where they were gathering together and protesting peacefully on the main street. I 
introduced myself to those protesters and asked them some questions about this case; some of 
them answered my questions by telling their personal stories and how they were treated 
throughout those events. I also interviewed a librarian, who told me more macro background 
information about that protest/case, who also gave me a recent published local chronicle 
(difangzhi) of that place, which included beneficial information about that place and helped 
me to learn about that place. 
        Being introduced by someone they knew helped me gain the participants’ trust, which is 
a significant advantage of this method, especially people who may be suspicious of talking to 
people they have never met. At the second and third sites of my fieldwork, I was lucky to 
build a connection with one of the main protest leaders in that village. They helped me to set 
up a group interview with some of the key protest leaders in that village, including one 
current village committee director, a former village committee director, a township 
representative, other village cadres, and the general public. I had two long conversations with 
them, which gave me in-depth information about this protest and that village. They also 
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introduced me to other protest leaders in my site three of my fieldwork. But protest leaders 
were not the only group of people that I spoke with, whenever possible I tried to talk with the 
general public in that village to listen to their views on that protest/case, and their stories 
added more detailed and personalized perspectives to those cases and helped to depict a 
complete picture of those cases.   
        In my fourth fieldwork site, I was not able to build a connection before I arrive there, so 
it took me a while to know someone in that village who can tell me some inside information 
of that village, and the protest happened there. I talked to both protest leaders and the general 
public and elders in that village. 
         During my interviews, all participants were asked to reflect upon the events leading to 
and resulting in the land protests. Since these events took place fairly recently, most members 
of that community were aware of the main dynamics of the protests (e.g. what initiated it, 
whether violence was involved, whether the government played a role, etc.), regardless of 
whether or not they themselves participated in the protests.  
Each interview lasted from ten minutes to about three hours (group interview). The 
interviews were conducted in Mandarin, the main language in China, which is also my 
mother tongue.  
       The following table provides a detailed breakdown of my interview sample and size. 
Table 3.3 Interview sample and size 
 Public personalities Broader population Total 
Liantang 0 3 3 
Fuyou/Jinning 0 5 5 
Guangji 3 3 6 
Tianmu 3 13 16 
Total 6 24 30 
 
         Doing field work had a lot of benefits for my research. For example, I was able to 
obtain information about what kind of strategies protest leaders adopted in this protest, 
whether or not they achieved their goals, how they mobilized others to participate, and so on.  
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3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I described the research method that will be applied in this project, namely, 
media analysis and qualitative methods such as ethnographic interviews. To select my sub-
national case studies, I will employ the MSSD approach. Combined, these methods will allow 
me to get more nuanced information about the most five influential large-scale land protests 
in rural China in the last six years and disclose the factors that contributed to the success of 
land protests in China. I will now move on to the second part of this thesis project and present 
the empirical analysis.  
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 Chapter Four: Empirical Case Studies 
In this chapter, I will briefly introduce each of these five cases studies in order. In each case, I 
will describe where, when, and how each case happened, what are the main events, how it 
ended, and what are the main actors/players in those cases. I will also talk about how those 
cases are similar or dissimilar to each other. The primary purpose of this chapter is to 
introduce each case rather than analyzing them.  So, it is descriptive in nature. I will focus on 
the analysis of those cases in the following three chapters. 
4.1 Liantang Case, Guangdong Province 
Liantang village54 is located in Tuolian sub-district (jiedao), Jinping district, Shantou city, 
Guangdong province.  
        The Liantang village protest began on October 25, 2012. Villagers protested at the 
Tuolian sub-district office, Jinping district government, and Shantou municipal government, 
but the government did not take any steps to solve their problems, leading the tensions 
between the Liantang villagers55 and government to escalate.  
        On July 7, 2014, this tension erupted into violence. The police first arrested some protest 
leaders and accused them of gambling on that day. Then, thousands of villagers gathered at a 
local stage,56 and the protest leaders urged their fellow villagers to take action to save the 
 
54 Liantang village is divided into five village or neighborhood committees (Juweihui). In 1997, they 
were Lianrong, Lianhua, Lianfeng, Lianguang, and Lianmei. But because media outlets still use 
Liantang as the village name, in this paper, I will also use Liantang as the village name, though it no 
longer exists politically. 
55 When I say “Liantang villagers”, I mean those villagers/residents who lived in Lianrong, Lianhua, 
Lianfeng, Lianguang, and Lianmei neighborhood committees because, politically speaking, Liantang 
village did not exist after 1997, and its villagers were divided into five neighborhood committees. 
Still, there is no clear boundary between these five neighborhood committees. I use Liantang village 
and Liantang villager as a convenience and as a convention. At the entrance of Liantang village, there 
is a stone erected by the local government and Liantang village (Liantang cun) is "written" on this 
stone, so local people still use Liantang village to describe this place. So, although, politically 
speaking, Liantang village no longer exists, people still use Liantang village as a geographic name and 
a cultural identity. 
56 The stage is an outdoor theatre center where villagers can perform operas, such as the Yue Opera, 
during festivals. 
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arrested protest leaders. Outraged villagers went to the Liantang police station and took three 
police officers as hostages; then, those villagers blocked the nearby national road (guodao) 
206. The government sent hundreds of police officers to crack down on this unrest. As a 
result of this protest, forty-seven police officers and dozens of villagers were injured, and 
eleven police vehicles were damaged (Shantou City Jinping District People’s Court, Criminal 
Verdict. 2015, No. 93).  
         The tensions did not end here but further escalated when thousands of villagers walked 
about fifteen kilometers to the Shantou municipal complex on September 26, 2014 and 
demanded that the municipal government investigate the issue of their land. No municipal 
government officials came out and talked with them, so they started to push down the gate of 
the government complex and clashed with hundreds of police officers who were on duty to 
protect the government building and the officials working there.  
        Liantang villagers’ grievances were the consequence of their lands being sold off by 
corrupt village cadres without their knowledge and consent, and they did not get any 
compensation for losing their collectively owned lands. During the past ten years, village 
cadres have sold thousands of mu57 of their lands to developers or other entities. 
         The outcome of the Liantang protest was a failure of the Liantang villagers, as the 
Shantou municipal government framed Liantang villagers as being “coerced by some 
criminals and (they) did not know the truth (of this incident/matter)” (bei bufa fenzi guoxie, 
buming zhenxiang de qunzhong) (Shantou Daily, September 28, 2014). The municipal 
government claimed that those villagers had been incited by some gamblers who were not 
happy with their capture by police on July 7, 2014. In the end, this protest lost its momentum, 
 
57 One mu is 0.165 acre. 
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as the local government arrested about one hundred protest leaders and participants of these 
two clashes58 without solving the villagers’ land issues.   
4.2 Guangji Case, Yunnan Province 
Guangji village is located at Jincheng township, Jinning county (now Jinning district), 
Kunming city, Yunnan province.  
        The Guangji protest started on December 26, 2012 when the Jincheng township 
government posted a bulletin announcing that the “ancient Dian Kingdom” (gudian 
wangguo) project would expropriate 14,933 mu of land from twelve villages in Jincheng 
township, including Guangji village and Fuyou village, among others. As was the case in 
other villages, Guangji villagers questioned the legitimacy of expropriating so much land 
from villagers, and they wondered whether the local government had approval from the state 
council.59 So, they asked the local government to show them the approval from the state 
council. However, the local government did not have approval. Thus, the villagers went to the 
Yunnan provincial government to petition, but they did not get a satisfactory answer from the 
provincial government either.  
        To keep their lands out of the hands of the local government, Guangji villagers formed a 
patrol force at Guangji village. They also set up five tents at different entrances to Guangji 
village. There were villagers in each tent; their job was to watch out for any outsiders who 
wanted to enter Guangji village and inform the whole village when someone wanted to 
“invade” it. Meanwhile, Guangji villages elected eleven villagers as their representatives to 
protect their lands. These protest leaders were at the front line of this movement.  
 
58 Interviewee C, March 6, 2019. 
59 According to China’s <Land Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China>, if the local 
government wants to expropriate basic farmland for any project, it needs the state council’s approval. 
See (Land Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China, 2004). 
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        On May 7, 2013, Guangji villagers held a village assembly, and seventy-eight percent of 
all eligible60 villagers signed a letter to expel the current village committee members. Yet, the 
Jincheng township government and Jinning county government did not recognize this recall. 
Then, on May 13, 2013, Guangji villagers held a ten-thousand-person meeting (wanren 
dahui) at Guangji village, a retired provincial leader, Yang Weijun,61 attended this meeting. 
On June 25, 2013, Guangji villagers caught some suspicious people who were stealing the 
basic-farmlands-protective-stele (jiben nongtian baohu jiezhuang)62 at Guangji village, and 
they were held as hostages. On the second day, Jincheng township government officials came 
to Guangji village to apologize for the incident. There were also some smaller clashes 
between the villagers and the local government before the “10∙22” Incident.63   
        After the “10∙22” Incident, the Jinning county government promised not to expropriate 
Guangji village’s lands for the gudian wangguo project. The Kunming city government and 
Jinning county government did not abandon the gudian wangguo project after the “10∙22” 
Incident, but they downscaled this project and did not use Guangji villagers’ lands.   
4.3 Fuyou Case, Yunnan Province 
Fuyou village is a neighboring village of Guangji village and is also located in Jincheng 
township, Jinning county, Kunming city, Yunnan province. In the Chinese context, the Fuyou 
 
60 “Eligible villagers” refer to villagers who have the voting right, which means they were over 
eighteen years old, and their household registration was at Guangji village.  
61 Yang Weijun, 98 years old, is a retired leader who served as a vice-chairman of the Yunnan 
People’s Political Consultative Committee. He is famous for speaking up for farmers' grievance in 
Yunnan province. He was acclaimed as “the most amiable official” (zui keai de guanyuan) in China 
by the media. 
62 Basic-farmlands-protective-stele is a sign erected by the local government to indicate the lands 
belong to the basic-farmland category. According to <Regulation on the Protection of Basic 
Farmlands> (1998), 80 percent of farmable lands should be designated as basic farmlands, and it is 
difficult to expropriate basic farmlands for other purposes. 
63 In this part, I referred to a media report. See Wang, Qiaopeng. April 24, 2014. “A story from 
Guangji village, Yunnan province. You can take away my life, but you cannot take away my lands” 
(Yunnan Guangji cun de baodi gushi: yaoming keyi, yaodi buxing). Honesty Outlook (Lianzheng 
liaowang). 
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case, also called the Jinning Incident, took place at Jining county (now Jinning district). The 
Jinning Incident happened on October 14, 2014. The clash occurred between hundreds of 
Fuyou villagers and about one thousand “workers”64 who were hired by developers to restore 
the construction of the “Fanya” project, which involved the expropriation of about 3,000 mu65 
of land from Fuyou village. In this conflict, at least eight people died66 (seven were 
“workers,” one was a villager), and eighteen people were injured (The Beijing News, October 
17, 2014), which made it is the deadliest land protest in China since the 2005 Dingzhou 
Incident. 
        This protest was triggered by land expropriation at Fuyou village. Since 2008, the local 
government had started to expropriate Fuyou villagers’ lands for different projects. First, they 
started with the “Nanche” Project in 2010, the “Fanya” project in 2011, the gudian wangguo 
project in 2012 and so on. As of 2014, Fuyou villagers had lost the majority of their lands, 
but each villager had only received less than 60,000 yuan as compensation.67  
       Fuyou villagers were not happy with the fact that they could not refuse the local 
government’s request for expropriating their valuable land, especially for the “Fanya” 
 
64 Those “workers” were not real workers, as most of them were thugs and idle personnel from society 
(shehui xiansan renyuan). They were hired by Yang Ruming, who made a deal with developers. 
According to the verdict, on October 12, 2014, four companies signed a contract with Yang Ruming 
stating that these companies would pay Yang twenty-two million yuan for the road construction in the 
“Fanya” project. They paid Yang eight million as a down payment; then, Yang used this money to 
recruit hundreds of thugs. They bought military uniforms and used police equipment for those 
“workers,” such as shields, helmets, tear gas, stab-resistant clothing, fire extinguishers, steel pipes, 
stones, and so on. The government played the role of a middleman between the two sides. On why the 
government uses thugs instead of police to expropriate farmers’ lands and do other dirty work, see, 
Ong (2018a, 2018 b), Chen (2017). 
65 On paper, the “Fanya” project only used 2,200 mu Fuyou village land. But, according to villagers, 
in reality, they used over 3000 mu of their land. Those developers only paid compensation for the 
1,700 mu of land. This kind of collusion has been common at Fuyou village during the past ten years. 
66 This number is from the verdict the court issued to the defendants. According to my interviewees, 
the actual number should be eleven people that died from this clash: two villagers and nine “workers” 
(Interviewee J, February 20, 2019). The number of people injured from this clash was much higher 
than eighteen. According to one of my interviewees, the actual number should be about fifty people 
(Interviewee L, February 22, 2019). 
67 According to a paper that one of my interviewees gave me, as of 2014, 5,485 mu of Fuyou 
villagers’ land had been expropriated, but each villager only received 59,180 yuan as compensation. 
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project, which only occupied 2,200 mu of Fuyou villagers’ land according to local 
government documents, but, in reality, took away more than 3,000 mu of their land. The local 
government forged their signature to agree to the “Fanya” project to expropriate their land. 
As a result, beginning on March 28, 2012, when the local government decided to clear 
villagers’ lands for the “Fanya” project, there were several clashes between local government 
officials, government-hired thugs, developers and Fuyou villagers. There was a clash between 
villagers and the developer side in June 2014. After that, the project stopped because of 
villagers’ resistance. Finally, on October 14, 2014, another violent incident occurred between 
villagers and the developers. During that clash, at least eight people were dead; six were from 
the developer-side-hired thugs, two were villagers. Among those six “workers” who died in 
this conflict, four were burned to death, and they suffered other injuries as well. It is one of 
the most violent protests in the last two decades that happened in China. 
        After this incident, the Kunming city government swiftly intervened, as both the 
Communist Party secretary and the mayor of Kunming city visited Fuyou village on the same 
day of this incident. They dispatched working groups to every group68 and each family in this 
village to understand their grievances and spread their propaganda, which is referred to as 
“thought work” (sixiang gongzuo). On October 21, the Communist Party secretary of 
Kunming city discussed the concerns of the villagers with representatives from Fuyou 
village. After this incident, twenty-one people were arrested (six were “workers,” and fifteen 
were villagers) (Xinhua News, October 28, 2014). Sixteen related local officials received 
administrative penalties or party discipline (For example, the county mayor of Jinning was 
discharged) (Nanjing Daily, October 24, 2014).  
 
68 A group (xiaozu) is a sub-unit of the village; there are eleven groups at Fuyou village. Fuyou village 
is an administrative village (xingzhengcun) that consists of the Fuyou natural village (zirancun), 
which has seven xiaozu and four other natural villages (each natural village is a group). 
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         This year (2019), five years since this incident, the judgment of the retrial of the first 
instance (yishen chongshen) was carried out, and one villager received a death sentence,69 
one villager received a death sentence with a reprieve, and another villager was sentenced to 
life in prison. Yet, the businessman who recruited hundreds of workers to invade this village 
only received a ten-year sentence, which was reduced from the life sentence given in the 
initial judgment.  
       In the short term, the villagers won the protest, as they, for example, received one year’s 
fanzufei70 (Interviewee G, February 19, 2019; Interviewee L, February 22, 2019) after this 
clash. The local government promised to give Fuyou villagers fanzufei by March of each 
year. The “Fanya” project was suspended after this protest.  
         But in the long term, the results for the Fuyou villagers were not so positive. For 
example, villagers only received one year’s fanzufei after the “10∙14” Incident, and the local 
government failed to deliver the following years’ fanzufei.71 Villagers could never get their 
 
69 According to a recent media report, some defendants appealed to the higher court for the second 
instance. The judgment on the second instance has not come out yet. See (Tan and Shi, 2019). 
70 The fanzufei is 3,000 yuan per mu each year. Because the “Fanya” project occupied over 2,200 mu 
of land (this is according to the paper; this project actually occupied over 3,000 mu of land from 
Fuyou village) of Fuyou villagers. Although not every household occupied the same amount of land, 
the compensation is the same; each Fuyou villager received 43,000 yuan as compensation. So, each 
year the local government will give villagers rent or fanzufei for occupying their lands. For this so-
called fanzufei, the standard is 3,000 yuan per mu each year. So, if one household occupied one mu of 
land in total, this household could receive 3,000 fanzufei every year. For a household, the more land 
that was expropriated by the government, the more fanzufei this household would get from the village 
committee. One reason why this protest happened was that villagers did not get their fanzufei from the 
local government, and their compensation from the “Fanya” project had been used up (Interviewee K, 
February 22, 2019). The reason for giving every villager the same compensation is to buy the vote of 
those villagers whose lands were not expropriated for the “Nanche” and “Fanya” project because to 
expropriate villagers’ lands, the local government needed the majority of villagers’ approval. So, the 
local government gave the same compensation for every Fuyou villager, though not everyone’s lands 
were expropriated by the government. But it is not fair for those whose lands were expropriated by the 
local government, so the local government promised to give them fanzufei every year as compensation 
for this unfairness. 
71 This year (2019), the Fuyou village committee used five years of fanzufei (2015–2019) to entice 
Fuyou villagers to give up control of their lands to the village committee. The village committee uses 
all kinds of means, including threatening villagers to achieve their goals, and most of the villagers 
have given up the fighting and accepted this money. But there are about twenty households at Fuyou 
village that have not accepted this money; nevertheless, their lands were taken by the village 
committee (Interviewee L, September 5, 2019). 
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lands back after this incident, and, even worse, control of their remaining lands was given to 
the village committee. The collusion between developers and local government officials was 
still rampant. Some Fuyou villagers received hefty sentences for the Jinning Incident, 
including one villager who received the death penalty.72 
       Another positive news story came from the anti-corruption campaign that the Communist 
Party started at the 18th National Congress of the CPC. So far, some of those high-ranking 
officials who were responsible or related to this incident have been investigated by the CPC 
discipline department, such as Qiu He,73 Qin Guangrong,74 Cai Desheng,75 Zhang Tianxin,76 
Gao Jinsong,77 Zhao Ligong78 and so on.  
4.4 Shangpu Case, Guangdong Province 
Shangpu village is located at Mianhu township, Jiexi county, Jieyang city, Guangdong 
province. Protests started there on February 22, 2013. Two days later, thousands of Shangpu 
villagers clashed with about one hundred thugs who were hired by a company79 that leased 
 
72 It is not the final result. She (the villager who was received a death sentence in the first instance 
judgment) is still waiting for the result of the judgment of the second instance. 
73 Qiu He was the deputy Communist Party secretary of Yunnan province when the Jinning Incident 
happened. He was the Communist Party secretary of Kunming city between 2007 and 2011. When 
Qiu He was the party secretary of Kunming city, Kunming started a pattern of “land expropriation and 
home demolition” (zhengdi chaiqian) in Kunming city. Many peasants, farmers, and homeowners 
began to petition to different levels of government. He was investigated by the Central Commission 
for Discipline Inspection (CCDI thereafter) in 2015. 
74 Qin Guangrong was the Communist Party Secretary of Yunnan province from 2011 to 2014. He 
was removed from the Communist Party secretary of Yunnan province on October 14, 2014, the same 
day the Jinning Incident happened. He surrendered himself to the CCDI this year. 
75 Cai Desheng was the Communist Party Secretary of Jinning county when the “10∙22” Incident 
happened. He was investigated by the Kunming Commission for Discipline Inspection this year. 
76 Zhang Tianxin was the Communist Party Secretary of Kunming city between 2011 and July 2014. 
He was investigated by the CCDI in 2014. He was expelled from the Communist Party and demoted 
from assisting roles of provinces or equivalents (fushengji) (level 4-5) to assisting roles of divisions or 
equivalents (fuchuji) (level 8-11). 
77 Gao Jinsong was the Communist Party Secretary of Kunming city between August 2014 and April 
2015. He was investigated by the CCDI in April 2015. 
78 Zhao Ligong was the public security bureau chief of Kunming city when the Jinning Incident 
happened. He was investigated by the Yunnan Commission for Discipline Inspection this year. 
79 The owner of that company was another village’s committee director. 
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Shangpu villagers’ lands in January 2013. Shangpu villagers were dissatisfied with their 
compensation for their lands being leased to an entrepreneur who was the village committee 
director of a neighboring village. This clash caused nineteen villagers to be injured, and 
twenty-nine vehicles were damaged, eight of which were burnt by villagers (Zheng, 2013).80 
        This protest escalated on March 10, 2013 when 3,000 security force members cracked 
down on this protest using tear gas, truncheons, and stun grenades, causing sixty people to be 
injured (The Daily Telegraph, March 12, 2013; Canberra Times, March 12, 2013; The 
Guardian, March 12, 2013; China Daily, March 13, 2013). After this incident, the Jiexi 
county government intervened by dispatching county government officials, township 
government officials, and village cadres. All together, three hundred people went to Shangpu 
village to do villagers’ thought work (BBC Chinese, March 1, 2013).  
       This protest was successful for the Shangpu villagers, as the court nullified the land 
contract, and the village committee director was arrested (The Guardian, March 12, 2013; 
Democracy &Legal System Times, April 14, 2014). The local government deposed both the 
Communist Party secretary and the mayor of the Mianhu township government after the 
second clash. In addition, the local government arrested fifteen people by March 14, 2013. 
Another twenty-three suspects were wanted by the police (Zheng, 2013). 
4.5 Tianmu Case, Tianjin Municipality 
Geographically distant from the above-mentioned villages in the south of China, Tianmu 
village is located in the north. It belongs to Tianmu township, Beichen district, Tianjin 
municipality. It is one of the largest Hui-Muslim communities in North China, with over 
20,000 inhabitants, and over eighty percent of its population was Hui-Muslim (The Straits 
Times, April 18, 2015).  
 
80 The local government’s figure for the injuries was only four villagers. See (Jiexi County 
Government Information Office, 2013). 
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       Another attribute that distinguishes the Tianmu village case from the rest of the cases is 
that this protest lasted over four years and was still ongoing as of the time of writing this 
paper, whereas the rest of the cases only lasted a few days or at most twenty days (the 
Shangpu protest lasted eighteen days) (Zhang, March 14, 2013). It started on January 12, 
2015 (The Daily Telegraph; Tianjin Municipality Beichen District People’s Court, Criminal 
Verdict, 2016, No. 422).  
       This protest was not triggered by land expropriation per se, but by the forced eviction of 
people from their houses by the village committee and township government. In 2008, 
Tianmu village started the “reconstruction of village in city” (chengzhongcun gaizao) 
process, and the local government wanted villagers to give up their homesteads and their 
houses that were built on their homesteads and move to high-rise apartments constructed 
nearby. But the process was not so smooth, as every villager wanted to get the lion’s share 
from the village committee for the compensation. There was a standard of compensation for 
villagers set by the district government, but Mu Xiangyou and the village committee did not 
follow the same standard for each household, instead providing financial compensation based 
on personal connections.  
       Later, when villagers found out about this unfairness, they started to resist the 
demolition. In 2011, the village committee started forced evictions of people from their 
houses, and about fifty household houses were evacuated by force by the village committee, 
including one of the two key protest leaders’ houses. Since then, villagers’ resentment and 
grievances have been accumulating, with the situation finally coming to a head on January 
12, 2015. In addition to the forced eviction issue, villagers were also unhappy about their 
collectively owned lands that had been sold by the village committee gradually, which they 
did not get any benefit from this. Therefore, land issues were also part of their grievance.  
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       One of their targets was a powerful man—the Communist Party secretary of Tianmu 
village, Mu Xiangyou, who has been the party secretary for thirty-seven years and had been 
elected as a deputy of the National People’s Congress (NPC) since 1988. He was depicted by 
the party as a national model who promoted harmony between different ethnic groups within 
China (Hui-Muslim and Han Chinese). But villagers accused him of corruption (some people 
said he embezzled about 10 billion yuan of public money) by selling their lands to real estate 
developers (The Daily Telegraph, April 2, 2015).  
       On January 12, 2015, about one thousand villagers gathered in front of the village 
committee every day requesting Mu Xiangyou to step down and the Communist Party to 
investigate Mu’s corruption (Boxun News, March 3, 2015). Most of the time, the protest was 
peaceful.  
       On January 30, 2016, this protest had lasted for 384 days. Nearly one thousand police 
officers cracked down on this protest and arrested several dozen activists (Radio Free Asia, 
2016). Two protest leaders received two-year sentences with two years’ reprieve in 2017. But 
they had already stayed behind bars for over five hundred days when this verdict came out.  
       After this, this protest lost momentum, but the villagers did not give up so easily, as 
when I was doing my field work, I was surprised to see that they were still protesting at an 
intersection of Jingjin Road and the main road to Tianmu village every day. 
      In the short term, this protest failed, as the municipal government cracked down on it by 
arresting dozens of protest leaders on January 30, 2016. The villagers achieved something in 
2015, as the village committee raised the pension standard for Tianmu villagers’ seniors who 
reached the age of 60. The villagers’ main aim was to get fair compensation for their houses, 
request for Mu to step down and be investigated, obtain fair compensation for losing their 
lands in the past few decades, etc. But these demands have not been met by the local 
government until now.  
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       In the middle and long term, this protest partially succeeded, as Mu stepped down as the 
Communist Party secretary of Tianmu village, and he was removed from the NPC in 2018 
(Tianjin Daily, October 2, 2018), though he has not been charged with any corruption so far.  
 4.6 Conclusion 
After providing a brief overview of the five case studies, I will now explore each of the three 
variables affecting large-scale land protests success in China. 
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Chapter Five: The Impact of Domestic Media on Protest Outcomes 
5.1 Introduction 
Media can play an important role in determining whether or not a protest succeeds (Hess, 
2015; Greenberg, 1985). Although China is an authoritarian regime, the central government 
attempts to present itself as legitimate in the eyes of its citizens. If domestic media reports 
can affect how the central government handles a specific protest that happens in China (Cai, 
2010; Li, 2016; Mertha, 2008; Huang, Zheng and Gui, 2016), the central government’s 
attitude will have an impact on how the local government deals with protests that happen in 
its jurisdiction.  
       In this chapter, I will examine how domestic media affect the outcome of large-scale land 
protests in China. In particular, I will examine whether my first hypothesis can or cannot 
stand and explain why: if the domestic media reports on this protest are supportive or on the 
protesters’ side, the likelihood of the success of the protests will be higher; whereas, if the 
domestic media reports are negative or on the local governments’ side or if there are no 
domestic media reports on this case, the likelihood of success will be lower. 
       Table 5.1 summarizes the media coverage of the protests and their outcomes. The 
outcome of a protest was measured on the basis of whether or not villagers were able to 
achieve all or part of their main goals within one year after they started the protest. This, as in 
the case of Fuyou, does not mean that villagers were necessarily satisfied with this outcome 
in the long run. 
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Table 5.1 Domestic media and protest outcomes 
Protest Name Domestic Media Attitude Outcome 
Liantang pro-government failed 
Guangji pro-villager successful 
Fuyou pro-villager successful 
Shangpu Neutral successful 
Tianmu None failed 
 
 
Table 5.2 summarizes the media position: i.e. whether they were pro-government or 
pro-villager. If a media outlet framed villagers as criminals, culprits, thugs and so on; if their 
attitude favored the local government; and if they did not interview villagers, I will code them 
as pro-government. If the media outlet interviewed villagers and investigated why and how 
these protests happened, I will code them as pro-villager. If the media outlet used a specific 
frame to depict villagers’ behaviors, such as rights protection, righteousness, victims, and so 
on, I will also code them as pro-villager. If a media outlet reported only facts and did not 
demonstrate a specific attitude towards this incident, then I coded it as neutral. If a media 
outlet only reported how the local government officials handled this incident, either by 
talking to villagers or interviewing local officials, and they did not talk much about why this 
protest happened, I will also code it as neutral. If there are no domestic media reports on this 
protest, then I will code it as none. 
Table 5.2 Domestic media’s attitude on each case 
  Pro-government Neutral Pro-villager None Overall attitude 
Liantang 13       pro-government 
Guangji  1 3 2   pro-villager 
Fuyou  22 36 42   pro-villager 
Shangpu   6 1   neutral 
Tianmu       none none  
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5.2 Pro-government Media Coverage (Liantang) 
The Liantang case is a pro-government case because the domestic media’s attitude 
toward/coverage of this case is on the local government’s side. I collected thirteen domestic 
media reports on the Liantang case81 spanning from September 28 to September 30, 2014. All 
those reports adopted the local government’s frame on this incident, which is a “premeditated 
and organized crime” (you yumou you zuzhi fanzui anjian). 
        After what happened on September 26, 2014, Shantou and Liantang drew much 
attention from domestic and international media because it was highly unusual to smash and 
loot a municipal government building in the daylight, particularly in China. Also, a lot of 
pressure was put on the local government from social media. Under that pressure, the 
Shantou municipal government held a public press conference. The municipal government 
framed this incident as caused by some thugs who were accused of gambling and were 
consequently arrested by the police. Those gamblers, according to the local government, 
ignited the villagers to protest in front of the municipal government complex without the 
villagers realizing the truth of this matter. The municipal government depicted those 
protesters as “coerced by some criminals and (they) did not know the truth (of this 
matter/incident)” (bei bufa fenzi guoxie, buming zhenxiang de qunzhong) (Shantou Daily, 
September 28, 2014).  
        In a press conference held on September 28, 2014, the Shantou municipal government 
said the reason for the clash that happened on September 26 was because:  
Some criminals were afraid of punishment by the law [because of the incident that 
happened on July 7, 2014], so they used the expansion of the landfill at Liantang village 
as an excuse; they manipulated public opinion and coerced people who were unaware of 
 
81 Including one from CCTV’s “News 1+1.” It is a transcript of the television program, which was 
hosted by Bai Yansong, a household name in China.  
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the truth to protest at the municipal government complex on September 26, 2014. (bufa 
fenzi yin haipa falv zhicai, jiekou fandui laji tianmaichang kuojian, bangjia minyi, 
guoxie buming zhenxiang qunzhong dao shiwei naoshi.) (News 1+1, September 29, 
2014). 
       There were thirteen domestic media reports on this incident; they all adopted the local 
government’s frame and did not reveal the villagers’ perspective on this incident. This is 
demonstrated by the title of a national newspaper report. The title was “Shantou 
[government] informed [the public] [villagers’] smashing and looting the municipal 
government complex incident, a premeditated and organized crime” (Shantou tongbao daza 
shiwei shijian: youyumou youzuzhi fanzui anjian).  
       Many villagers were angry that domestic media relied heavily on the local government 
frame. As one of my interviewees said, 
“The [local] government is lying! We went to the municipal building of Shantou on 
September 26, 2014 to petition for our lands, not because someone was caught for 
gambling. This was a tactic used by the [local] government. He [Lin Jianzhong, a protest 
leader] was arrested not because of gambling but because he led our villagers in 
protesting; gambling is just an excuse used by the [local] government. We were fooled 
by the media and [local] government!” (Interviewee A, March 3, 2019). 
       The local authorities framed this incident as caused by thugs who were caught gambling 
by police and were afraid of punishment from the law. It was explained that these criminals 
(bufa fenzi) ignited other villagers to protest the local authorities (CCTV, September 29, 
2014; China News Service, September 28, 2014). Communist Party-controlled media outlets 
such as CCTV were in favor of the local authority’s framing instead of villagers’ viewpoints 
(CCTV, September 29, 2014).  
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        All thirteen domestic media outlets that reported on this protest used the Shantou 
municipal government’s frame to depict this protest as “a premeditated and organized crime.” 
No domestic media reported from the perspective of the villagers, partly because the local 
government was trying to block all domestic media efforts to reach those villagers. As one of 
my interviewees said, 
“The [local] government tried to block all domestic media who wanted to talk to 
villagers. ……The [local] government even arrested some university students who came 
to investigate this issue; these students came from Shantou University [only a few 
kilometers away from Liantang village].” (Interviewee A, March 3, 2019) 
       After this clash, the local government arrested twenty-six villagers on the same day the 
protest happened (Shantou Daily, September 28, 2014). In total, the local government has 
arrested about one hundred villagers so far,82 and some protest leaders are still in prison 
today. Not surprisingly, this protest ended with failure, as the villagers’ lands have not been 
returned to them,83 and they still have not received any compensation for losing their valuable 
lands.  
        Because the media portrayed those protest leaders as thugs and criminals, some were 
even forced to give false confessions on a CCTV news program. As a result, those protest 
leaders lost their legitimacy and credibility to mobilize/lead again. Furthermore, because no 
domestic media reported from the villagers’ perspective, they lost an important ally, and 
therefore the likelihood of success was lower. 
 
82 This information was given by one of my interviewees at Liantang village. 
83 Although so far, no actual changes have happened at Liantang village, the local government began 
to change their working style and pay more attention to villagers’ grievances. The government made 
some small changes during these years, such as dissolving the Liantang village collective assets 
management group in December 2014. The government divided the former Liantang villagers’ 
collective assets into those five neighborhood committees, making village affairs more transparent.  
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       Thus, this case fits my hypothesis. Although there were thirteen domestic media reports 
on this case, they were all on the local government’s side, so eventually this protest ended in 
failure. 
5.3 Pro-villager media coverage (Guangji, Fuyou) 
There are two cases that fit this category—the Guangji case and the Fuyou case. I collected 
six domestic media reports on the Guangji case: two were pro-villager, and the other four 
were neutral. Those reports spanned from October 24, 2013 to February 5, 2016. 
         The first report was covered by The Beijing News on October 24, 2013, two days after 
the “10∙22” Incident. Because the Beijing News is a consumer-oriented media outlet, it 
reported from the viewpoint of the Guangji villagers, as they interviewed some protest 
leaders in this report. Although this report was short, it covered what happened on October 
22, 2013, and why this clash occurred. This report quoted villagers and said the trigger of this 
clash was due to forced land expropriation (qiangxing zhengdi). Two protest leaders were 
interviewed, and it mentioned that four villagers were injured by the police. I coded this 
media report as pro-villager. 
       The second report was published on April 24, 2014 by Honesty Outlook (Lianzheng 
liaowang), a magazine managed by the Sichuan Daily Press Group that focuses on anti-
corruption. This investigative report covered the details of the story of Guangji villagers 
protecting their lands from the local government. It included many details on how the 
tensions between the local government and Guangji villagers had escalated since the 
announcement of the land expropriation plan of the gudian wangguo project at Guangji 
village. Thus, it promoted the villagers’ version of the story and therefore was a positive 
report for Guangji’s villagers. This report depicted villagers’ behaviors as a form of rights 
protection (weiquan). The report states that eighty-three percent of Guangji villagers who 
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were over eighteen years old signed a letter saying they were against the land expropriation. 
One villager said, they “can take away my life but [they] cannot take away my land” (yao 
wode ming dao keyi, yaodi bukeyi). Another villager, who was also a protest leader, said in 
this report, “I can give up my wife, but I will use my head to protect my lands” (laopo keyi 
buyao, tudi wo yao yong tou laibao) (Wang, 2014). This report also mentioned that two 
villagers were severely injured, and over thirty villagers were injured from the clash that 
happened on September 22, 2013, but they were denied treatment from nearby hospitals. 
Because this report used the frame of rights protection to describe villagers’ behaviors, I 
coded this media report as pro-villager. 
        One domestic media coverage on this case is coded as “pro-government,” as it reported 
from the perspective of the local government and did not focus on the “whole picture.” 
        The other three reports were neutral reports on how some protest leaders were arrested 
after the “10∙14” Incident, and the trial related to it. The local government did not retaliate 
against the Guangji villagers until the Fuyou Incident happened. After the Fuyou Incident, the 
municipal government thought some Guangji villagers played a part in this event, so they 
arrested six Guangji villagers on October 22, 2014, the first anniversary of the Guangji 
Incident. Four of them received sentences and served their sentences, and the other two 
protest leaders received sentences with a reprieve. 
        Those domestic media reports might not have influenced the outcome of the Guangji 
villagers’ protests, as the decision to abandon the land expropriation at Guangji village for the 
Kunming municipal government-backed gudian wangguo project was made before the first 
media report. However, those positive reports contributed to ensuring that the local 
government kept its word after the protest was finished. Although some may disagree with 
this, the reality is the local government did not break their word after the “10∙22” Incident. 
Instead, the local government changed the design drawing for the gudian wangguo project 
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after this conflict. Therefore, those reports had an indirect impact84 on the outcome, as the 
Guangji villagers succeeded in their protest. So, in this case, the domestic media outlets 
played the role of “watch-dog,”—even though, they could not affect the outcome of the 
protest directly, their positive media report on those villagers made sure that the local 
government did not break their words after they conceded in the first place.      
       For the Fuyou incident, I collected one hundred media reports, including commentary 
articles on this incident spanning from October 14, 2014 to April 13, 2017. Among those 
reports, ninety-one were written in October 2014, and twenty-nine articles were editorials 
from different media outlets; the majority of those editorials were on the villagers’ side. 
There were nineteen reports that were investigations and were mainly conducted by 
consumer-oriented media outlets, such as the Beijing News, Beijing Times, Beijing Youth 
Daily, and so on. These media outlets interviewed many Fuyou villagers and brought their 
stories and grievances to China’s readers, so they were all on the villagers’ side.  
       Many of those domestic media channels were on the villagers’ side, and they had many 
questions that needed the local government to address. For example, one national 
newspaper’s commentary asked: 
“Which one was the trigger of this conflict? Did the developers’ side try to ‘return to 
work,’ or did they hire some thugs to intimidate villagers? These are two different kinds 
of behavior. The local government’s investigation said the developers’ side recruited 
nearly one thousand workers to resume work [on that day]. But from journalists’ reports, 
 
84 There are other explanations for why the local government kept its word after the “10∙22” Incident; 
for example, the cost for the local government to keep its word was not high because the project had 
not started when this protest happened. Another explanation is the possibility that another bigger 
protest could happen if the local government did not keep their word. Then, the situation could 
become worse than the “10∙22” Incident. But, undeniably, the two pro-villager reports made the cost 
for the local government to break its word higher than if there were no such reports. Because the 
public will have evidence of the local government failing to keep their word if they choose to change 
their minds after this conflict. Then, the local government would be at the center of public opinion if 
another protest happened at Guangji village after the local government changed their minds. 
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we knew those who were wearing uniforms were musclemen hired by developers, and 
their job was to use violence against the villagers, beat them and threaten them [to give 
up their lands]. And they started the preparation one week ago…..” (Fu, China Youth 
Daily, October 21, 2014) 
       Another market-oriented newspaper published an editorial on October 17, 2014. It stated:  
“The [local] government’s most basic responsibility is to be the ‘Night’s Watch,’ to 
maintain public security, to prevent the law of retaliation and to demand that ‘blood must 
atone for blood.’ Both the mastermind of this fighting and people who committed 
intentional homicide in this tragedy should be punished by the law. But the public also 
has to ask: Where were the police when hundreds of people were fighting? Did the local 
government and the police commit misconduct during the process?” (The Beijing News, 
October 17, 2014) 
       According to the criteria of coding for the purpose of this research, thirty-six domestic 
media reports were neutral, forty-two were pro-villager, and twenty-two were pro-
government. So, in general, the domestic media’s attitude towards this protest was pro-
villager. 
        Fuyou villagers got one-year’s fanzufei after this protest, and it was substantial for them. 
The Kunming municipal government dispatched many government officials who came to 
Fuyou village and helped them with their problems. So, in the short term, it was a successful 
land protest for Fuyou villagers.   
        This is because, if the local government did not meet one of Fuyou villagers’ main 
requests for waging this protest after the “10∙14” Incident, the local government would lose 
its legitimacy both in the eyes of Fuyou villagers and all Chinese citizens because almost all 
domestic media reports showed sympathy for Fuyou villagers’ resistance. So, the only 
available choice for the local government is to make concessions to Fuyou villagers’ 
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demands and take care of those villagers. Compared to giving up the “Fanya” project 
completely, giving villagers one-year’s fanzufei85 is an affordable choice for the local 
government. Otherwise, the local government would lose its legitimacy if they did not make 
an appropriate concession to villagers after so many domestic media outlets had reported on 
this incident.  
        The Fuyou case speaks to the role of customer-oriented media as a proxy of public 
opinion in an authoritarian country like China, a role that was pointed out earlier by Mertha 
(2008:10). The central government in China cares about how domestic media report on 
specific incidents, as it wants to maintain its legitimacy. If the domestic media questioned 
whether or not the local government at Kunming or Jinning committed misconduct before or 
during the “10∙14” Incident, the pressure on the central government would be high, and this 
pressure would pass to the local government. This could explain why giving in to one of the 
villagers’ main demands was a wise choice for the local government after the “10∙14” 
Incident.  
     The Fuyou case also tells us that domestic media outlets’ coverage, in this case, were not 
always in line with the local government’s preference. For example, another research, which 
also focused on the Fuyou case and collected 81 domestic media reports on this case, found 
that among those media coverage, 41 were “negative” reports (from the standpoint of the 
government), 21 were neutral, 19 were “positive” reports86 (most of which were produced by 
government-sponsored media outlets, such as Kunming Daily and Yunnan Daily.) (Wang and 
Song, 2016). This case indicates that even in an authoritarian regime, such as China, domestic 
 
85 One of Fuyou villagers’ main requests for this project was to get their fanzufei for the “Fanya” 
project from the local government (Interviewee K, February 22, 2019). 
86 Their media reports number is different from mine because my research collected from a more 
extended period than theirs. Also, the outcome of the coding of domestic media’s coverage of this 
incident resulted from the different coding rules. 
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media outlets can enjoy some degree of freedom of press on some issues that were tolerated 
by the central government.        
        This case also tells us that we should distinguish between short-term outcomes from the 
long-term outcomes. By short-term, I mean the outcome of the protest that happened or 
achieved within one year of the main event/protest of that case. By long-term, I mean the 
outcome of the protest that achieved after one year of the main event/protest of that case. In 
the short-term, the Fuyou villagers realized some of their targets, i.e., they received one 
year’s fanzufei after the “10∙14” Incident, the Fanya Project was suspended, etc. But in the 
long term, the result for Fuyou villagers was not so positive. For example, villagers only 
received one year’s fanzufei after the “10∙14” Incident; the local government failed to deliver 
the rest of the years’ fanzufei.87  Villagers never got their lands back after this incident, and, 
even worse, control of their last lands was put in the hands of the village committee this year. 
Collusion between developers and local government officials is still rampant. Some Fuyou 
villagers received hefty sentences for the Jinning Incident, including one villager who 
received the death penalty.88 
        Although Fuyou villagers won in the short term after the “10∙14” Incident, that did not 
necessarily mean they would also win in the long term,89 as most Fuyou villagers were not 
happy with the fact that they had lost control of their last lands and were worried that the 
village committee would sell all their lands and they would become landless farmers. 
 
87 This year (2019), the Fuyou village committee used five years of fanzufei (2015–2019) to entice 
Fuyou villagers to give up control of their lands to the hands of the village committee. The village 
committee used all kinds of means, including threatening, to achieve their goals, and most of the 
villagers gave up the fighting and accepted this compensation. But there are about twenty households 
in Fuyou village that did not accept this compensation; nevertheless, their lands were taken by the 
village committee (Interviewee L, September 5, 2019). 
88 It is not the final result yet. She (the villager who received a death sentence in the first instance 
judgment) is still waiting for the result of the judgment of the second instance. 
89 This is also true for the Wukan case. See Chapter Two. 
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5.4 Neutral Media Coverage Case (Shangpu) 
 
The Shangpu case belongs to the “neutral” media category. I collected seven domestic media 
reports on the Shangpu case spanning from February 25, 2013 to July 21, 2014. Only one 
media report (from China News Service) was on the clash that happened on February 24, 
2013. It was a short report from the perspective of the local government. There were two 
media reports after the incident that happened on March 10, 2013, one of which is from the 
Jiexi county government information office,90 which was published on March 11, one day 
after the second clash. It revealed information about how this protest happened, how it 
escalated for eighteen days and what actions the local government took after these two major 
clashes. The second one also comes from the Guangdong channel of China News Service; its 
content was similar to the first report by the Jiexi county information office. I coded those 
three media reports as neutral, as they did not lean to either the local government side or the 
villagers’ side.91 
      The fourth media article was by Democracy & Legal System Times and was published on 
April 14, 2014. It covered the whole story of how and why this protest started; it mentioned 
the first clash that happened on February 24, 2013, but it did not mention the second clash 
that occurred on March 10, 2013, when the local government dispatched three thousand 
police officers to oppress the Shangpu villagers. Because this media report interviewed 
 
90 This report that was released by the Jiexi county information office (Jiexixian xinwenban) per 
se may not count as a domestic media report, but because the Guancha Syndicate reproduced this 
report on its website, and because the Guancha Syndicate is a domestic media outlet, I deemed it a 
domestic media report. 
91 Although those media reports reported from the perspective of the local government, they framed 
those two clashes as triggered by the collusion between the village committee and vicious powers 
(eshili), so they did not blame the villagers but rather the two sides who colluded with each other. So, 
I coded those reports as neutral. 
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several villagers and presented the reason for this protest, I coded this media report as pro-
villager.  
      The other three media reports were covered by The Beijing Times, Nanfang Metropolis 
Daily, and Information Times. All three media reports covered the result of the trial of the 
Shangpu Incident, and the prime culprits—the entrepreneur and the village committee 
director of another village—received a twenty-five-year sentence. I coded all of them as 
neutral. Overall, the domestic media’s attitude towards this case was neutral.  
        The outcome of this protest, according to official information, was a successful one for 
Shangpu villagers, as the local government had met their two main targets of this protest—
nullifying the land-releasing contract and punishing those criminals who were responsible for 
the two clashes.  
       The domestic media’s attitude towards this case was generally neutral, but the outcome 
of this protest was a successful one for the Shangpu villagers. This case suggests that neutral 
media coverage may still help (or at least not hinder) the villagers achieve their main targets. 
This distinguishes this study from the works done by Mertha (2008), Cai (2010), and Li 
(2016), who did not include neutral media coverage in their studies.  
         Why was this protest successful for Shangpu villagers? I contend that there are three 
explanations for this unexpected outcome. Firstly, the domestic media reports on this incident 
put pressure on the local government to solve this crisis properly. Although the first domestic 
media report on this case was neutral, it still put pressure on the local government, because if 
they did not handle this protest properly, their political careers would be in danger, as they 
would be seen as failing at their jobs. Maintaining social stability has, after all, become the 
first priority for all Chinese local government during the past two decades92 (O’Brien &Li, 
 
92 During the past decade, many local officials received punishment from upper-level government for 
failing to maintain social stability, e.g., a large-scale protest or mass incident happened in their 
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2006; Chen, 2012; Lee, 2007; Fu, 2018; Hurst, 2009; Edin, 2003; Yang, 2017; Wang, 2012; 
Wang, 2015). Moreover, this media report was covered by central-level media—China News 
Service.93 If the local government officials did not handle this matter carefully, they would 
put their political careers at risk.  
       Secondly, the local government was not the target of this protest. This protest happened 
between Shangpu villagers and a private company owned by another village committee 
director. Although the village committee was accused of corruption in this protest, it was 
easier for the local government to give in and meet villagers’ demands because the village 
committee is not a level of government. 
       Thirdly, this protest happened at a sensitive time of the year—i.e. during China’s two 
sessions94 (lianghui) period.95 Every year’s lianghui time is a sensitive period for China’s 
political elite, as the world’s media are often focused on China’s political arena. Any turmoil 
that occurs in this period in China will draw the world’s media attention, which put a lot 
pressure on the provincial leaders of Guangdong province. This factor is expected to induce 
the provincial government to intervene and ameliorate the villagers’ grievances. 
5.5 What happens in the absence of domestic media coverage? (Tianmu) 
As I mentioned earlier, there were no domestic media reports on the Tianmu case. 
 
jurisdiction. For example, both the party secretary and county government mayor of Weng’an county 
were deposed after the Weng’an Incident that happened in 2008. The county mayor of Jinning county 
government was also dismissed for the Jinning Incident. 
93 Some studies showed that national-level media’s attitude had an important effect on the outcome of 
protests that happened in China, see (Li, 2016:204), (Huang, Zheng, and Gui, 2016). 
94 Two sessions refer to the annual plenary sessions of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the 
National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). They are 
usually held from March 3 to mid-March each year in Beijing, China’s capital. The lianghui period, 
along with the National Party Congress of the CPC, which are usually held every five years, with a 
plenary session of the central committee of the CPC, which is usually held each year, are the most 
important meetings in China. 
95 Chen’s (2009) research also found that the timing of a protest has an indirect effect on its success in 
China, see (Chen, 2009:467). 
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Although this protest may be the longest protest that has happened in the history of China, no 
domestic media have reported on this protest so far. Possible reasons explaining why it has 
been difficult for Tianmu villagers to reach out to domestic media to air their grievances are 
their ethnic identity as Hui Muslim (about 80 percent of Tianmu villagers are Hui Muslims), 
and minority issues are a sensitive topic for the Chinese central government.96  
       Another explanation for the lack of domestic media reporting on the Tianmu protest is 
that the village is close to Beijing, the capital of China. The distance between Tianmu village 
and Beijing is only about one hundred kilometers, so if domestic media reported this protest, 
it would not reflect well on both the central government and local government. Thus, it is 
likely that there is a reporting ban on the Tianmu villagers’ protest from the Publicity 
Department of the CPC Central Committee. 
       The Tianmu case fits with my hypothesis very well. According to my hypothesis, if there 
were no domestic media reports, the likelihood for a protest to succeed in China would be 
low, and, in reality, because there were no domestic media reports on the Tianmu villagers’ 
protest, they had not succeeded one year after they started their protest. 
        This also suggests that current research on the role of media in determining the outcome 
of a protest in China cannot explain why some large-scale land protests were not reported on 
by domestic media in China. Unlike democratic countries like the U.S. and Canada, where 
the media enjoys freedom of the press, China is still an authoritarian regime, and its domestic 
media do not have the freedom to report, and the domestic media are still under tight control 
by the propaganda department of the CPC. Thus, not all large-scale land protests in China are 
reported on by the domestic media. As the Tianmu case showed, the outcome of this protest 
was likely to fail in the end. 
 
96 On why minority issues are a sensitive topic in China, see Côté (2014). 
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        But that does not mean that Tianmu villagers will end with nothing because, in the long 
term, the local government had to solve this problem to achieve peace and stability in this 
village. The local government took actions three or four years after this protest started, such 
as replacing Mu’s position in this village, “electing” new village committee members and 
village cadres in 2018 and so on. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined five cases that belong to four categories to see whether or not 
domestic media coverage affected land protest outcomes.  
        When the domestic media reports were pro-government, the protest was more likely to 
fail, because after the domestic media’s negative reports and the local government’s 
repression, it was difficult for the villagers to mobilize again, especially when most protest 
leaders had to pay a high price to mobilize again. This was proved by the Liantang case. It 
also showed that the local government can influence how the domestic media reports on or 
frames a protest in China.97 
        When the domestic media reports were pro-villager, the outcome of the protest tended to 
be successful. There are two mechanisms for how domestic media reports influence the 
outcome of a protest: either directly or indirectly. As many research studies such as Mertha 
(2008), Cai (2010), Li (2016), Li, Koppenjan and Verweij (2016) and Huang, Zheng and Gui 
(2016) have shown, domestic media coverage increases the likelihood for a particular protest 
in China to achieve its goals. As Mertha (2008) already pointed out ten years ago, domestic 
 
97 A recent illustration of this is the notorious “eight warriors incident”. A group of 8 medical 
professionals from Wuhan – including Dr. Li Wenliang - had started warning the public about a novel 
coronavirus affecting the community. On January 1, 2020, a CCTV news program reported that the 
eight individuals were punished by the local police for spreading rumors about the outbreak of the 
virus. The death of Dr. Li in early February following complications related to the virus drew the ire 
of Chinese netizens who started criticizing the local government and domestic media for covering up 
the issue. 
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media reporting in China can serve as reflection public opinion for the central government. 
Because the central government cares about its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens (Cai, 
2010; Zhao, 2001:23), when domestic media reports favor the villagers’ side, the central 
government will be under the pressure to intervene, and the local government, to ensure its 
survival, has to make concessions to its villagers, as the Fuyou case showed. This also 
suggests that the domestic media not only can affect the outcome of an environmental protest 
(Li, 2016; Li, Koppenjan and Verweij, 2016), it can also affect the outcome of a large-scale 
land protest in China. 
        But that does not mean the villagers will also win in the long term, as shown by the 
Fuyou case, thus showing that the power of domestic media is limited. The extant research on 
protests (Mertha, 2008; Cai, 2010; Li, 2016a, Li, Koppenjan and Verweij, 2016) has not quite 
captured that point. 
        The second mechanism affecting protest outcomes in China is through an indirect 
process, as shown by the Guangji case. Although it is hard to prove, it is reasonable to believe 
that the domestic media’s favorable reports on the Guangji case have served a “watchdog” 
function after the protest finished. The existence of positive domestic media reports on the 
Guangji case can partly explain the long-term success of this protest.  
        When the attitude of domestic media’s attitude is neutral, the outcome of the protest 
tends to be successful, as shown by the Shangpu case. This is something that was not well 
captured by previous studies.  
         Last but not least, when there were no domestic media reports on a particular large-
scale land protest, the outcome was more likely to be negative, as shown by the Tianmu case. 
There are some explanations for the absence of domestic media reports for a large-scale land 
protest, such as when it involved minorities or when it was very close to Beijing. The extant 
research did not recognize that China is still an authoritarian regime and the domestic media 
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does not have freedom of the press, so not all large-scale land protests in China are reported 
on by the domestic media. 
       Overall, this chapter shows how the domestic media plays the role of “catalyst” for a 
protest to succeed (e.g., Fuyou) or the role of “watchdog” (e.g., Guangji). The absence of 
domestic media reports would lead to failure for the protesters (e.g., Tianmu), whereas 
negative domestic media reports are likely to lead to the failure of a protest (e.g., Liantang). 
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Chapter Six: The Impact of Violence on Protest Outcomes 
6.1 Introduction 
Scholars have found that violence plays an important role in determining the outcome of a 
protest. Cai (2010) found that the more violent a protest was, the more likely the central 
government would be to choose to intervene on their behalf, making it more likely for 
protesters to achieve their goals. Chen (2009, 2012) agreed that protests that use disruptive 
tactics are an effective way to accomplish their objectives. This has also been confirmed by 
Li’s (2016) research on environmental protests that happened in China from 2006 to 2013. 
This chapter will examine the following hypothesis: The more violent a land protest, the 
greater the likelihood of success. In return, the less violent a land protest, the less likely it is 
to succeed. 
       Table 6.1 summarizes the relationship between the level of violence and protest 
outcomes. The level of violence was measured by whether or not people died or were injured, 
and, if so, how many.98 If there were causalities in the conflict, I coded it as a high level of 
violence; if there were more than 2599 people injured on both sides during the protest, then I 
coded it as a medium level of violence; and if there were fewer than 25 people injured on 
both sides during the conflict, then I coded its level of violence as low. The outcome of a 
protest was measured using the same rules as in the last chapter: If the protesters achieved 
part of or all of their targets, then I coded it as a successful land protest; otherwise, I coded it 
as a failed land protest. For a better understanding of the mechanism for a successful land 
 
98 In this research, acts of violence include death, injuries, kidnapping, and the victims can be either 
villagers, government officials or third party.  To make it easy to analyze, when measuring the level 
of violence, I only included causalities and injuries as the indicator/benchmark of violence, regardless 
of who was attacked. 
99 The threshold of 25 people injured is borrowed from the definition of “armed conflict.” Researchers 
used a death toll of 25 people as the threshold for “armed conflict,” see (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 
2001). 
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protest, a new variable was included in this table: which side used violence, and, if necessary, 
which side used violence first during the conflict. 
Table 6.1 Violence level of protests and protest outcomes 
  Level of violence Who used violence Outcome 
Fuyou high both sides, villagers used first successful 
Guangji medium both sides successful 
Shangpu medium both sides successful 
Liantang medium both sides, villagers used first failed 
Tianmu low police failed 
6.2 High level of violence (Fuyou) 
The Fuyou case represents the highest level of violence, as at least eight people died during 
the conflict. This is not the first time the two sides100 clashed with each other. In preparation 
for the Fanya Project101, Fuyou villagers’ lands began to be expropriated in 2012. On March 
17, 2012, the Fuyou village committee posted a notice informing villagers to clear their lands 
by March 21, otherwise the village committee would clear their lands by force. On March 28, 
2013, the Jincheng township government and the Fuyou village committee worked together 
to destroy villagers’ vegetable greenhouses using bulldozers, which caused an eruption of 
violence between villagers and the local government. Several villagers were beaten by the 
police, local government officials, and thugs. One of the people interviewed for this research 
was among the injured. He said: 
“I was beaten on March 28, 2012. I was seriously injured by those thugs, but the hospital 
only gave me a certificate to ‘prove’ I received minor injuries. In addition, I was beaten 
by them twice, and no one helped me to find justice. I have been petitioning to different 
levels of government in recent years.” (Interviewee U, February 22, 2019) 
 
100 Villagers and “workers,” and workers’ true identity was thugs that were hired by the developers to 
intimidate Fuyou villagers.  
101 The full name of the Fanya project is the Yunnan Fanya Business Logistics Center for Industrial 
Products; henceforth, I will use Fanya Project for simplicity. 
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        On November 12, 2013, another conflict occurred between villagers and the 
contractor.102 One of the interviewees, now ninety years old, was beaten by thugs. Because 
the Fanya Project occupied one of Fuyou villagers’ main roads, this was the reason why the 
conflict on June 3 happened. On June 3, 2014, there was another major conflict between 
Fuyou villagers and the constructor side in which both sides were hurt. To better prepare 
themselves to protect their lands, Fuyou villagers had set up checkpoints at three different 
entrances to the village before June 3, 2014. 
      Finally, the tensions between villagers and developers erupted into a deadly conflict. On 
October 14, 2014, about seven hundred “police”103 came to Fuyou village. The villagers, 
however, heard the news before the police actually arrived there. Four developers made a 
deal with Yang Ruming, an infamous gang leader in Jinning; they agreed to pay Yang 
twenty-two million yuan for the road construction project within the Fanya Project. To 
restore the construction, the developers gave Yang eight million yuan as a down payment, 
and Yang used this money to recruit between seven hundred and one thousand thugs from the 
surrounding areas (Yunnan Province Kunming Intermediate People's Court, Verdict in 
Criminal Case. 2015, No.166). With the local government’s help, Yang also purchased used 
police equipment from the market: police uniforms, long staves, electric prods, riot shields, 
tear gas, helmets, stones, and more. First, Yang and his team dispatched eight people to scout 
Fuyou village, but they were caught when they were found eating breakfast at a rice noodle 
shop. They were then held as hostages. This did not deter the constructor side. They 
continued their invasion, and both sides eventually clashed with each other. According to 
most domestic media reports, the “worker” side used violence first (The Beijing News, October 
17, 2014). The hostages’ hands were tied, and they were forced to kneel on the ground as they 
 
102 I used contractors, developers, constructors interchangeably, allmeaning the developers’ side. 
103 Their true identity was thugs. Here, I use “police” to describe them because they dressed like 
police when they were arriving to Fuyou village. 
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were splashed with petrol. They were the most vulnerable party during this clash. In the end, 
four of the hostages died, the youngest being only eighteen. At least two villagers died: one 
from Fuyou village and one from a neighboring village.  
        In total, the Fuyou conflict caused at least eight deaths.104 Among the causalities, at least 
six “workers” died during the clash, four of whom were hostages. According to domestic 
media reports, two villagers died, but according to the interviewees, only one of them died 
because of the conflict, and the other died from disease. But, according to one of the 
interviewees, there was another villager who came from a neighboring village who died due 
to the conflict. In addition, a worker died after he was sent to the hospital. According to 
domestic media reports, eighteen people were injured because of this clash. But, according to 
some of the interviewees, the number of injured villagers could have been as high as fifty to 
eighty people. Many villagers who were injured did not dare go to the hospital for fear of 
retaliation by the local government.  
     In terms of who used violence in this conflict, both the villagers and “workers” used 
violence during the clash, but villagers’ side used it first because they kidnapped 8 “workers” 
at the beginning of the incident. The local government was not directly involved in this 
conflict, though there were some local government officials at the scene, and they were on 
the “workers” side when the bloodshed happened (Yunnan Province Kunming Intermediate 
People's Court, Verdict in Criminal Case. 2015, No.166).  
 
104 Those numbers came from early domestic media reports on this incident. Later, some domestic 
media outlets reported that a “worker” died at the hospital, so the new number of causalities was nine. 
But, according to some of the interviewees, one of the two villagers who were reported to have died 
during the conflict actually died from disease. But there was another villager who came from the 
neighboring Baisha village who died because of the clash. The number of causalities was still nine 
people, but the details were different between the reports and reality. According to another source, 
eleven people died during the conflict, but I could not verify this claim. 
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        Why then, would violence lead to a successful land protest? The reason, I argue, is due 
to media coverage, as the more violent a protest is, the more likely it is to be reported on by 
the domestic media.105 As one of my interviewees clearly pointed out: 
“One of the reasons why we choose to fight with those invaders and beat them to death 
is that we want to draw the media and the public’s attention to our cause through the 
media’s reports and the public’s attention so the central government will know our cause 
and grievance. We hope the central government will choose to intervene in this incident 
and help us solve our land problem……If nobody dies, then no people will know about 
our case or grievance. We choose to use violence to draw the media’s attention because 
this was our last choice……” (Interview L, February 22, 2019) 
        In this case, villagers treated violence as a strategy they used to draw the domestic 
media’s attention, but their final hope was to receive attention from the central government. 
The villagers’ reason was quite simple: if their case was reported on by China’s domestic 
media, then the possibility of the central government intervening was high. The outcome of 
this protest validated the villagers’ strategy, though in the end they paid a high price for their 
victory. 
         After the clash, dozens of China’s domestic media outlets dispatched journalists to 
Fuyou village to report on this incident, such as The Beijing News, Beijing Times, Beijing 
Youth Daily, The Paper and so on. Not only did the commercial-oriented domestic media 
report on this incident, but also national, Communist Party-controlled media outlets, such as 
Xinhua News, China Youth Daily, and even the People’s Daily also published commentary 
articles in the villagers’ favor. Those factors persuaded the central government and the 
Yunnan provincial government to deal with this matter carefully, even if it meant making 
 
105 Since 2009’s Tang Fuzhen Incident, China’s vulnerable people have learned to use self-immolation 
and violence to protect their rights. On the Tang Fuzhen Incident, see (Xinhua News, December 4, 
2009). 
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concessions to the villagers. If the local government did not handle this incident 
appropriately, the central government could lose its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens; for 
the local government, if they did not handle this matter carefully, their political career would 
be in peril. Therefore, this can explain why, in the short term, the Fuyou villagers’ protests 
were successful. 
      Overall, the short-term outcome of this protest fits with the hypothesis, which is “the 
more violent a land protest, the higher the likelihood of success.” But, as discussed earlier, 
the long-term outcome of this protest did not fit with the hypothesis. 
6.3 Medium level of violence (Guangji, Shangpu and Liantang) 
       The climax of the Guangji case happened on October 22, 2013. On that day, hundreds of 
police clashed with hundreds of Guangji villagers. Twenty-four officials (mostly police 
officials106) were taken by villagers and held as hostages. This incident caused forty officials 
(mostly police officers) to be injured, including three who were seriously injured (Jin, 
October 30, 2013); over thirty villagers were wounded, including two who were seriously 
injured (Wang, April 24, 2014); and thirty cars were damaged by villagers (Jin, October 30, 
2013).  
       One of my interviewees described the situation when the villagers captured two students 
from the local government side, 
“Some of them were real police, but some of them were not real police. There were two 
girls among the police; we later found out they were students of Yunnan University of 
Finance and Economics (YNUFE), but they dressed like police, dressing in police 
uniforms and wearing helmets. They were in front of the real police and confronting 
villagers. At that time, we did not know their real identities, and we thought they were 
 
106 Some of them were not real police officers but were still students (Interviewee E, February 19, 
2019). 
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real police, so they were beaten by villagers because they were no match for the 
villagers, as the villagers had more strength because they are used to farm work. So, they 
were held as hostages by villagers. After the villagers took off their helmets, the villagers 
realized they were not the police, but students. So, the villagers stopped beating them. 
Then, they were kept as hostages to pressure the local government to release protest 
leaders that were arrested earlier that day …… I asked them why they were there with 
the police. They said they were students of YNUFE, and the local government asked 
them to be interns but did not tell them the details and the risk of this job. They dressed 
in the police uniforms without knowing the risks of doing so, and they were taken to 
Guangji village with the police, and they were not aware what they were up for …… We 
wanted their parents to pressure the local government and the university to save them so 
we could exchange the hostages with the police/government. We said that it was 
irresponsible for the government to let these students go in the front of the real police, 
and in doing so they were putting their lives in danger because many villagers were 
farmers who had their weapons—steel bars used in the greenhouse. If some villagers did 
not control themselves and beat these students to death, the consequences for this would 
have been unimaginable……” (Interviewee E, February 19, 2019). 
       The scale of violence in the Guangji case is coded as “medium,” and both sides (villagers 
and the police) used violence during the clash.107 The villagers were very united during the 
process as is shown by the recollection of the village committee members. The outcome of 
this protest was successful. 
       After the conflict happened, both the central government and the Yunnan provincial 
government learned of this incident. The then-minister of the Ministry of Public Security of 
 
107 According to Jin (2013), 41 police officers were injured during the clash on October 22, 2013, 
including 3 who were badly injured. At least 20 Guangji villagers were injured during the conflict 
(Interviewee F, February 19, 2019). 
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the PRC gave instructions (pishi) on this matter, and the then-secretary of Yunnan province 
also gave instructions on this matter. On the second day of the clash, the Communist Party 
secretary of Kunming city, who was also a member of the Standing Committee of the Yunnan 
Provincial Party Committee (SCYPPC henceforth), along with another member of the 
SCYPPC, and the head of the commission for political and legal affairs of the CPC Yunnan 
provincial committee went to Guangji village to deal with this incident (Police Command 
Division of Kunming Public Security Bureau, October 23, 2013). The provincial government 
intervened in this incident, and, in the end, the Guangji villagers succeeded in their protest. 
        Why did the violence lead to a successful ending for the Guangji villagers in this case? 
Although no one died in this case, the Guangji villagers took twenty-four government 
officials, most of whom were police officers, including two students, as hostages on October 
22, 2013. The stakes were high for the authorities. Also, the Guangji villagers were very 
united on this matter, as over eighty percent of the villagers were against the land 
expropriation, and they elected eleven villagers as their delegates. After the local government 
released two villagers who had been arrested, these two villagers did not keep their word to 
persuade the villagers to release those officials who were kept as hostages. Then, the local 
government side lost their bargaining chips with the villagers. To rescue those government 
officials, their only choice was to make concessions to villagers’ demands, which were to 
give up expropriating villagers’ lands for the gudian wangguo project. Finally, after an over 
twenty-four-hour standoff, under pressure from the central government,108 the local 
government gave in to the villagers’ demands. If the central government had not intervened, 
this incident could have ended with the villagers either being badly hurt or dead if the local 
 
108 According to inside information provided by one of my interviewees, after the clash happened on 
October 22, 2013, the central government, in this case the minister of the Ministry of the Public 
Security, gave instructions (pishi) on this incident, because  the minister of the Ministry of the Public 
Security is a state councillor, so he can represent the central government.  
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government had chosen to use force to rescue those hostages. On the other hand, the situation 
for those hostages could have become even worse, and they might have died if the local 
government had not acted in time to solve this problem. Either way, this was not good for the 
central government, because it would either lose its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens if 
villagers had died during the conflict, or some government officials would have lost their 
lives in this incident. Although it did not reach a “high” level of violence, this case fits 
perfectly with my second hypothesis: “the more violent a land protest, the higher the 
likelihood of success.” 
       The Shangpu protest started on February 22, 2013. Two days later, thousands of Shangpu 
villagers clashed with about one hundred thugs who were hired by a company that leased 
Shangpu villagers' lands in January 2013. This protest escalated on March 10, 2013 when 
3,000 security forces cracked down on this protest using tear gas, truncheons, and stun 
grenades, causing injuries to thirty to forty people (The Daily Telegraph, March 12, 2013; 
Canberra Times, March 12, 2013; The Guardian, March 12, 2013; China Daily, March 13, 
2013). The scale of violence of this protest is “medium”, as over twenty-five people were 
injured.109 Both sides (villagers and the police) used force. This protest was successful, as the 
court nullified the land contract, and the village head was arrested (The Guardian, March 12, 
2013; Democracy & Legal System Times, April 14, 2014). Another sixteen people were 
detained. 
        This protest was successful because, after this incident happened, the Jiexi county 
government chose to intervene by dispatching county government officials, township 
government officials and village cadres. Altogether, 300 people went to Shangpu village to 
 
109 This number of injuries is from the villagers' side; we did not know how many police officers were 
injured. The local government said the injuries from that conflict were only four people, see (Jiexi 
county government information office, March 11, 2013). According to international media reports, 
about sixty villagers were injuried during the second clash, see (Canberra Times, March 13, 2013). 
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do villagers' thought work (BBC Chinese, March 1, 2013). Because this protest was reported 
on by both domestic media and international media, and as this incident happened during 
the lianghui period, the pressure put on the Guangdong provincial leader to solve this 
problem smoothly was high at that time. 
       Why did violence lead to a successful ending for the Shangpu villagers? Limited media 
reports suggest that the timing of this protest may have had an impact on its outcome. When 
the second clash happened during the lianghui period, the Publicity Department of the 
Communist Party issued a reporting ban for domestic media (China Digital Times, March 16, 
2013). This also suggests that the central government had started to intervene in this incident. 
Because many people were injured in the second clash and because it happened at a sensitive 
period, the central government chose to intervene in this affair. The intervention from the 
central government put pressure on the local government to handle this matter appropriately, 
inducing the local government to deal with this matter carefully and perhaps even to give in 
to villagers' demands, such as nullifying the leasing contract and punishing those local cadres 
who failed at their jobs. Therefore, this case fits with my second hypothesis, though no one 
died during the conflict: “The more violent a land protest, the higher the likelihood of 
success. In turn, the less violent a land protest, the less likely it is to succeed.” This 
observation is in line with Chen’s (2009) study, which suggests that the timing of a protest 
matters. 
         At the beginning of the Liantang protest, villagers were peaceful, as they chose to 
petition to different levels of government, from the sub-district government to the district 
government and the municipal government. But all those governments did not give them a 
satisfying answer to their request. Thus, on July 7, 2014, the tensions between villagers and 
the local government escalated into violence.  
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      On that day, the police arrested some protest leaders for gambling behavior. however, the 
villagers did not believe those people were truly caught gambling; they thought the real 
reason for their arrest was because they were their protest leaders. So, later, thousands of 
villagers gathered at the stage of Liantang village. They went to the Liantang police station 
and took three police officers as hostages and took them to a “shame parade” in Liantang 
village. Then, they blocked a national road, and they clashed with hundreds of police officers 
later that night. This clash caused forty-seven police officers to be injured, dozens of villagers 
were injured, and eleven police vehicles were damaged. During the first violent 
confrontation, both sides used violence, but because the villagers held three police officers as 
hostages, it is fair to say that the villagers' side used violence first. 
      The second violent clash happened two months later, on September 26, 2014. On that 
day, thousands of villagers walked about fifteen kilometers to the Shantou municipal 
complex and demanded that the municipal government investigate the issue of their lands. 
They wanted the municipal government leaders to talk with them directly, but no one came 
out of the municipal government building and spoke to them, so they started to shake the gate 
of this building. Eventually, they were fighting with hundreds of police officers. Both sides 
received injuries during the clash, and, according to some accounts, ninety-five police 
officials were injured during the conflict. There was no exact number of how many villagers 
got hurt, but from the photos shown, many villagers were bleeding after this clash, and 
according to some Chinese-language international media outlets, about thirty villagers were 
injured in the conflict.  
      In terms of the scale of violence, the Liantang case is coded as “medium” because more 
than twenty-five people were injured during this conflict, but no one was killed.110 Although 
 
110 There is no exact number of how many villagers were injured during the protest from domestic 
media reports, but some Chinese-language international media reported that about twenty people were 
injured during the protest on September 26, 2014. 
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the Liantang case reached a “medium” level of violence, this protest did not end with a 
successful result for its villagers as the previous two cases did. The main reason why I 
believe it was not successful is that during these two clashes, villagers used violence first, 
especially during the first clash on July 7, 2014. Thus, this gives the local government an 
excuse to suppress them and frame this incident in their favor to China's domestic media. 
Because the villagers used violence first, they lost the moral ground to protect their lands, as 
using violence is not legitimate in a society that treats peace as propriety for the society. 
Although Chinese society sometimes does have sympathy in cases in which the vulnerable 
side used violence to air grievances or achieve justice such as in the Ji Zhongxing case,111 Jia 
Jinglong case,112 or Zhang Koukou case,113 the public generally has a lower tolerance for 
people who use violence to protect their rights. As a result, this gave the local government a 
good opportunity to frame this incident in their favor, though those affected villagers did not 
recognize the local government’s framing. But, in China's society, where many things happen 
every day, after the municipal government held a press conference and domestic media 
reported on what the local government had said, Liantang villagers lost their chance to draw 
domestic media attention and air their grievances in front of the public. Hence, in the end, the 
Liantang villagers lost this battle. 
 
111 Ji Zhongxing was beaten by some public security members in Dongguan, Guangdong province in 
2005 and became disabled. He had petitioned to local government three times for justice for his 
treatment by the local government, and he was not satisfied with the result. So, in 2013, he went to 
Beijing Airport and set off an explosion at the airport. He was injured from the explosion. The court 
sentenced him to six years of imprisonment for his crime. 
112 Jia Jinglong’s home was demolished by the local government through force in 2013. His fiancée 
cancelled their wedding because of this incident. So, he went to petition but did not get any result. He 
killed the village committee director of his village, who he thought was responsible for his home’s 
demolition in 2015. He was sentenced to the death penalty by the court in 2015. 
113 In 1996, Zhang Koukou’s mother was beaten to death by two brothers. One of the culprits, who 
was only a teenger at that time, received a seven-year sentence from the court but was released three 
years earlier. Zhang’s family received about 10,000 yuan in compensation from the culprits’ family. 
But, in 2018, Zhang Koukou went after these two brothers who killed his mother over twenty years 
ago and killed them both as well as their father. Zhang Koukou was sentenced to death by the court 
and was executed in 2019. 
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      Secondly, some protest leaders made mistakes by participating in gambling activities,114 
as this gave the local government a perfect chance to arrest them and use this as an excuse for 
explaining why so many villagers joined the second violent confrontation. Hence, in the end, 
although the scale of violence in this protest was “medium,” this protest did not succeed. 
Therefore, this case does not fit with my hypothesis, but it may point to the importance of 
who uses violence first. If the villagers’ side use violence first, the chances for the villagers to 
succeed appear to be lower. Thus, this case suggests that not only does the level of violence 
matter, but also which side uses violence first matters when deciding the ultimate outcome of 
a protest. 
6.4 Low level of violence (Tianmu) 
The Tianmu case represents the low level of violence category. Although the Tianmu case is 
the one that lasted the longest, it was a relatively peaceful protest. It first started on January 
12, 2015, when thousands of villagers gathered at the front of the Tianmu village committee, 
and protest leaders gave speeches to their fellow villagers to encourage them to join their 
cause and fight against the current Tianmu village cadres. 
      From January 12, 2015 to January 30, 2016, thousands of villagers gathered at the front of 
the village committee and listened to protest leaders' speeches; some protest leaders even 
dressed in traditional petitioning garb115  while they were delivering their speeches. The local 
government did not intervene much during this period. Although on March 25, 2015 and 
December 30, 2015 the police department ordered to finish the assembly, villagers did not 
stop their protest. Then, on January 30, 2016, about one thousand police were dispatched to 
disperse this protest, with dozens of protest leaders being arrested, and some villagers getting 
 
114 Gambling culture is prevalent in Guangdong province, and Macao is next to Guangdong province. 
115 Traditional petitioning garb has a big Chinese character “冤” （yuan）(which means wronged) on 
it. 
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injured during this process. Two key protest leaders stayed in prison for over five hundred 
days. Other protest leaders were arrested and remained in prison or a detention center for a 
shorter time.  
      This protest failed because it involved a low level of violence.  
Also, no domestic media reported on this protest, so most Chinese people did not know about 
this incident. As a result, the central government did not have any urgent need to intervene in 
this case. Thus, in the end, Tianmu villagers did not succeed with this protest.  
      In terms of who used violence in this protest, some villagers were injured when about one 
thousand police came to disperse the villagers' protest on January 30, 2016, so it is fair to say 
that the police used violence in this protest. Also, villagers in this protest were generally 
moderate as they did not use violence against those heavy-handed force on that day. 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined the role of violence in affecting land protest outcomes. 
        When the level of violence is high, especially when protesters died during the 
conflict,116 the outcome of that protest tended to be successful. This was because when a high 
level of violence occurred, it was more likely to be reported on by domestic media, making it 
more likely to draw the central government's attention and lead to intervention. This was 
confirmed by the Fuyou case. Although it seems that Fuyou villagers initiated violence 
during the “10∙14” Incident, compared to the opposite side, which was better equipped and 
had the advantages of numbers, they were the weaker side, and they were the victims of land 
expropriation processes. Therefore, in the eyes of public opinion, they enjoyed some kind of 
moral ground, as reflected by the majority of domestic media’s reports of this incident. So, in 
the end, Fuyou villagers won this protest.  
 
116 In the Fuyou case, the majority of the deaths were from the developers’ side, which had the local 
government’s support. At least two villagers died as a result of that conflict. 
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        It also showed that although violence can induce a favorable outcome for villagers in the 
short term, it does not necessarily mean it will also ensure a good result for villagers in the 
long term, as there may be other factors (e.g., the cost for the local government to give-in, 
whether or not the villagers were united, etc.) that can influence the outcome in the long-
term. Thus, although Cai's (2010) theory can explain most of the cases, it fell short of 
recognizing the difference between short-term outcomes and long-term outcomes. 
      When the level of violence is “medium,” the outcome of that protest also tends to be 
successful, but under some conditions it may end in failure. Two of the three cases (Guangji 
and Shangpu) coded as involving a medium level of violence ended with successful outcomes 
for protesters. One case (Liantang) did not end in a successful result because during these two 
clashes, the villagers’ side used violence, which gave the local government side the perfect 
excuse to frame the protest in their favor. So, the conditions that will not bring a good result 
for villagers are if villagers use violence first and when the local government finds a reason to 
justify suppressing the protestors and can frame the issue in their favor. For the Guangji case, 
even though it also belongs to the “medium” category of violence, because at least two 
villagers and three police officer were severely injured during the clash (Wang, 2014; Jin, 
2014), the severity of the situation is close to “high” level of violence; thus it explained why 
this case ended with a successful outcome for Guangji villagers. Thus, although Cai’s (2010) 
theory can explain many cases, under some conditions, villagers’ use of violence will not 
bring a favorable outcome for themselves, especially when they choose to use violence first. 
       When the level of violence is low, the outcome of the protest tends to fail. This is 
because if there is no violence, both the domestic media and central government are not going 
to pay attention to their cause, and the central government is less likely to choose to 
intervene; therefore, the likelihood of achieving a successful result is low, as shown by the 
Tianmu case. 
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      Thus, generally speaking, Cai (2010), Chen (2009, 2012), and Li’s (2016) theories stand 
up quite well, especially Cai's (2010) argument that the more violent a protest is, the more 
likely the central government is to intervene. However, he failed to recognize that there were 
differences between short-term outcomes and long-term outcomes. In some cases, such as the 
Fuyou case, the villagers won in the short term, but they lost in the long term. Cai (2010) and 
Chen (2009, 2012) also did not realize that villagers’ use of violence will not always lead to a 
favorable outcome for themselves, especially when they use violence first, and the local 
government finds an excuse to “fool” them as the Liantang case showed. 
      Overall, the findings of this research are more in line with Yang’s (2016:2190) 
conclusion, which is that “violence is a necessary but insufficient condition for large-scale 
non-environmental protests' success.” 
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Chapter Seven: The Impact of Timing on Protest Outcomes 
7.1 Introduction 
Scholars have found that if an environmental protest happened at the early stage of a 
developmental project in China, the local government was more likely to give in and adopt 
tension reduction strategies, but if an environmental protest occurred at a later stage of a 
project, the local government tended to use a suppression strategy to push that project 
forward and ignore protesters’ grievances (Li, 2016). This analysis is based on cost-benefit 
analysis from the viewpoint of the local government of the area where the environmental 
protest occurred. If the protest happens at the beginning of a project, the cost for the local 
government to give up this project is small because the local government or private 
companies will have little money and resources invested in the project by that point. 
However, if a protest occurs at the end stage of a project, at that point, a lot of 
money/resources have been invested in the project, and the cost for the local 
government/company to give it up is high. Therefore, the local government has a strong 
incentive to use force to suppress those protesters and finish the project. This analysis not 
only applies to environmental protests in China, but I would argue that it also fits with land 
protests in China. In this chapter, I will examine how the timing of a large-scale protest 
affects the outcome of the protest. 
       Table 7.1 summarizes the relationship between the timing of a protest and the outcome 
of that protest. As we can see, two incidents (Guangji and Shangpu) happened in the early 
stages of the project, and both protests succeeded in the end. One incident (Fuyou) happened 
in the middle stage of that project, and because of the occurrence of violence, this protest also 
ended with a successful outcome for the villagers.117 Two incidents happened at the end stage 
 
117 As mentioned in previous chapters, the outcome is defined within a one-year frame. The long-term 
outcome for Fuyou villagers is a failure or a standstill at best. 
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of the project, and both protests ended up failing. In the next part, I will describe the details 
of each protest.  
Table 7.1 The timing of the protest and the outcomes 
Incident name Timing of the protest Outcome 
Guangji early stage successful 
Shangpu early stage successful 
Fuyou middle stage successful 
Liantang end stage failed 
Tianmu end stage failed 
7.2 Protests occurring at the early stage of the project (Guangji and Shangpu) 
       As the summary of the events in Guangji in Chapter Four highlights, the protests 
happened at the beginning of the gudian wangguo project before the local government started 
to expropriate their lands. It is crucial that Guangji villagers agreed early on that the local 
government's compensation was too low compared to their current income, so they needed to 
protect their lands from the local government. Moreover, because they became familiar with 
national and local laws and the process of land expropriation, they knew which documents 
the government had to produce. Because this project was only approved by the Yunnan 
provincial government, and they did not get the state council's approval, the villagers knew 
the Yunnan provincial government's behavior had violated the < Land Administration Law >, 
and they felt justified in protesting. Guangji protesters ultimately won, as after the 10∙22 
Incident the Jinning county government promised to give up expropriating their lands for the 
gudian wangguo project. The local government gave in after the 10∙22 Incident because this 
project had not yet started, and the losses experienced due to giving in to those villagers was 
relatively small. They only needed to change the plan for the gudian wangguo project and 
exclude Guangji village from the plan.  
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        Like the Guangji case, the Shangpu case118 also occurred at the beginning stage of the 
project. In January 2013, a company named Wanfeng Investment Development Co., Ltd 
(Wanfeng company hereafter) signed a land leasing contract with the Shangpu village 
committee. Because this contract was not approved by Shangpu villagers, Shangpu villagers 
started to protest against this contract from February 11 onwards. On February 22, 2013, the 
first clash happened between Shangpu villagers and the developer side. On that day, Shangpu 
villagers defeated about one hundred thugs that had been hired by the developer’s side. The 
villagers also burned 29 cars left behind by those thugs. The tensions between villagers and 
the local government/developer’s side remained high between February 22, 2013 and March 
10, 2013, when the second major conflict happened. On that day, the local government 
dispatched 3,000 police and armed police (wujing) to Shangpu village and dispersed the 
protest, causing about sixty villagers to be injured.         
        Nonetheless, according to China's domestic media reports, this protest ended with a 
successful outcome for Shangpu villagers, as the county government/court nullified the land 
leasing contract. Also, the Shangpu village committee director was arrested (The Guardian, 
March 12, 2013; Wang, April 14, 2014). The local government deposed both the Communist 
Party secretary and the mayor of the Mianhu township government after the second clash. In 
addition, the local government arrested fifteen people by March 14, 2013, and another 
twenty-three suspects were wanted by the police (Zheng, 2013). Wu Guicun, the main culprit 
of this protest, was sentenced to twenty-five years of imprisonment, and another accomplice 
received a nineteen-year sentence (Lin, Lin, Fan, Zhang, and Lin, July 21, 2014). 
      One of the reasons for Shangpu villagers' success was that this protest happened at the 
beginning stage of the building of the industrial park, which occupied Shangpu villagers' four 
 
118 This part mainly referred to journalist Wang Han's report, which was published in < Democracy & 
Legal System Times > on April 14, 2014. 
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hundred mu of lands. This protest only happened one month after the Shangpu villagers had 
lost their lands to the village cadre, which signed the land leasing contract with Wanfeng 
company secretly, so the cost for the local government to reverse this contract was low 
because the local government did not need to invest any money to satisfy those discontented 
villagers. 
7.3 At the middle stage of the project (Fuyou) 
The Fuyou case happened at the middle stage of the project. In 2010, the Fanya Project119 
started to occupy Fuyou village lands for construction.120 At that time, there were not any 
land expropriation agreements between villagers and the developers121 behind the Fanya 
Project. On July 4, 2011, the Fanya Project started the first phase of its construction. In 
February 2012, the Fuyou village committee announced through its speaker that the Fanya 
Project was going to expropriate Fuyou villagers' lands. Some villagers asked the village 
committee whether or not the local government had approval (from upper-level government, 
such as the provincial government or central government) to expropriate their lands. Yet, the 
villagers did not get any answer from the village committee. Thus, some villagers opposed 
the expropriation of the lands at the very beginning.  
       On March 17, 2012, the village committee posted a bulletin that showed that the Fanya 
Project was going to expropriate 1730 mu of Fuyou villagers' lands, and those lands involved 
eight small groups from Fuyou village.122 In the announcement, the village committee 
stipulated that the deadline for villagers to clear their crops and ground attachments was 
 
119The full name of the Fanya project is the Yunnan Fanya Business Logistics Center for Industrial 
Products; henceforth, I will use Fanya Project for simplicity. 
120 This case was mainly based on Wang and Guo's work (2016). 
121 According to the media's report, in the beginning, three "developers" were behind the Fanya 
Project: the Shiyan Chamber of Commerce, Chengdu Chamber of Commerce, and Fujian Province's 
Z-Stone Co., Ltd. 
122 As I mentioned earlier, there are eleven small groups in Fuyou village. 
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March 21, 2012, and if the villagers did not clear their lands, the local government would do 
it themselves, and villagers would not be compensated for the loss. But, by March 28, 2012, 
the majority of the villagers involved had not cleared their lands for the expropriation. So, the 
Jincheng township government organized a group of people to clear the lands, such as by 
bulldozing anything on the ground, which was met with villagers' resistance. A clash 
occurred between the local government officials' side and Fuyou villagers, and some villagers 
were hurt in the conflict.  
       On March 21, 2012, the deadline for villagers to clear their lands by themselves, eight 
villager representatives went to the Department of Land and Resources of Yunnan Province 
(DLRYP hence after) to petition. Their question was whether the (provincial) government 
had approved the Fanya project's land expropriation plan. Yet, they did not get an answer 
from the DLRYP, as the DLRYP passed on those villagers' petition to its subordinate 
department (Kunming City Bureau of Land and Resources) to answer the villagers' question. 
But, the Kunming City Bureau of Land and Resources also did not reply to them. Although 
the Fuyou villagers did not agree with the land expropriation plan, they accepted the local 
government's compensation at the price of 43,000 yuan per person for giving up 1730 mu of 
land to the Fanya Project.123The majority of villagers accepted this money, not because they 
accepted the land expropriation plan, but for the loss of clearing the lands.124 Yet, they signed 
their names on a blank paper. But the local government thought the villagers had accepted the 
land expropriation compensation standard because they now had the villagers' signatures on a 
blank piece of paper, so they could put what they wanted on that paper as proof showing that 
the villagers had agreed to the land expropriation compensation standard. This compensation 
 
123 As I mentioned earlier, in reality, the Fanya Project occupied over 3,000 mu of Fuyou villagers' 
lands for that project. But on paper, this project only expropriated 1,730 mu of Fuyou villagers' lands. 
124 The loss of destroying the crops on the lands and other infrastructure such as greenhouses on the 
ground. 
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was one-off, and the local government promised to give Fuyou villagers fanzufei for those 
whose lands had been expropriated by the local government (Huai, 2014), (Interviewee L, 
February 22, 2019). 
       On September 4, 2012, villagers went to the DLRYP to petition again. On September 6, 
2012, villagers went to the Yunnan People's Procuratorate to petition. On September 10, 
2012, villagers went to the Yunnan Provincial Public Security Department to petition. On 
October 31, 2012, three large projects at the Yunnan Fanya Business Logistics Center for 
Industrial Products (Fanya Project) started their construction. When those projects were 
started at Fuyou village or places around Fuyou village, villagers did not cause trouble at that 
time because they were afraid of the developers’ side. After that event, villagers continued 
their petition activities: On January 22, 2013, they went to the Yunnan People's Political 
Consultative Committee to petition; on January 31, 2013, they went to the Yunnan Provincial 
Public Security Department to petition again; and, on June 30, 2013, they went to the Yunnan 
Provincial Bureau for Letters and Calls to Petition. All those petitions did not bring Fuyou 
villagers any information about whether the Fanya Project had the central government's 
approval for expropriating their farmlands. 
      In May 2014, Fuyou villagers found that the Fanya Project had occupied one of their 
main roads connecting the village and the provincial Highway 102. The villagers did not 
receive any notice indicating that the road was included in the Fanya Project, so they were 
angry with the developers, and they were not satisfied with the compensation package. So, 
when they realized that one of the main roads was occupied by the developers, they tried to 
stop the construction of the Fanya Project. On June 3, 2014, the developers' side clashed with 
the Fuyou villagers. According to villagers and journalists, about one thousand people were 
involved in this conflict, including about five hundred to six hundred people from the 
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developers' side (most of whom were thugs recruited by the developers' side). Dozens were 
hurt in this conflict, but the villagers won the battle. Since then, the construction at Fanya 
Project has stopped by the developers. In the meantime, the villagers have continued their 
cause through petitions to different levels of government. On September 10, 2014, they went 
to the Kunming municipal bureau of state land and resources to petition and to verify whether 
the Fanya Project had got approval from the central government or the provincial government 
of Yunnan and, if so, where were the documents. They received no answer. Again, villagers 
went to the Kunming municipal bureau of state land and resources to petition and ask the 
same question as in September, but they got the same response as last time. Four days after 
this petition, the "10∙14" Incident happened. The result of that event was at least eight people 
killed and dozens injured. Since then, the Fanya Project has been stopped indefinitely on the 
Fuyou village's territory.125 
       In the Fuyou case, the land expropriation of the Fanya Project at Fuyou village started as 
early as 2010, but at that time, the villagers did not know what the land expropriation was for, 
and they did not get any compensation from the local government or developers. Since 2012, 
the local government has openly expropriated Fuyou villagers' lands for the Fanya Project, 
and the local government forged the villagers' consent for the land expropriation. The 
villagers were not satisfied with the compensation standards/package of this land 
expropriation plan. They accepted the money provided by the local government, but they 
thought the money was only for the compensation for the ruined crops and construction on 
their lands, and not for losing control of their lands. Gradually, they realized the 
compensation money they received was not enough to maintain their current living standard 
in the long term. They also came to learn that the local government was colluding with the 
 
125 The Fanya Project also involved other villages' lands, but not as much as the Fuyou village, so a 
small part of the whole Fanya Project was able to continue the construction after the "10∙14" Incident 
and was finished by the time of my fieldwork in February 2019. 
  98 
developers to cheat villagers because the local government did not get official land 
expropriation approval from the central government as the <Land Administration Law of the 
People's Republic of China > required. The Fuyou villagers were inspired by the behavior of 
their neighboring villagers at Guangji in October 2013, as they successfully won their battle 
against the local government for giving up the land expropriation plan for the Gudian 
wangguo Project completely. The result of this protest, however, was not as satisfying as the 
Guangji case because their protest happened at least two years after the Fanya Project begun, 
and when the protest occurred, a lot of construction had already been done by the developers. 
A lot of investment had been made in this project, so the stakes for both the developers and 
the local government were very high compared with the Guangji case if the local government 
decided to give in to villagers' demands, such as raising the compensation standards for the 
Fuyou villagers. Yet, in the short term, Fuyou villagers won this protest, as the local 
government stopped the construction of the Fanya Project, and the local government 
promised to give Fuyou villagers fanzufei by March of each year, and they received one 
year’s fanzufei after the land protest. However, in the long term, the Fuyou villagers were not 
the winner of this protest, but neither were the local government or the developers, as the 
Fuyou villagers never got back their expropriated lands, and after receiving one year’s 
fanzufei after the "10∙14" Incident, the local government failed to deliver the fanzufei from 
the years 2014 to 2018. Also, when I was doing my fieldwork at Fuyou village, the village 
committee was trying to use the five years (2014–2018) of fanzufei to induce Fuyou villagers 
to give up the last lands they still controlled by themselves and hand them over to the village 
committee. Most villagers were against this policy, but a few dared to organize another 
protest again, which was dangerous, considering that those protest leaders in the “10∙14" 
Incident received very severe sentences from the courts. One of my informants told me that 
only about twenty families refused to hand back their lands to the village committee, and the 
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rest complied with the village committee. Thus, in the long term, the Fuyou villagers were 
not the winners, as the local government was able to take advantage of the Fuyou villagers’ 
weakness and control almost all the Fuyou villagers’ lands.  
7.4 At the end stage of the project (Liantang and Tianmu) 
The Liantang case fits with the category of "at the end stage of the project." To be specific, 
there was not a particular project involved. Still, the protest happened as a result of a pattern 
of behavior that lasted about twenty years; that is, the local government was selling Liantang 
villagers' lands to private developers at a relatively low price, and the Liantang villagers did 
not get a penny from those deals.  
        Liantang village has a complicated history compared to most of China's villages; this 
can be seen from its history of changing the names and size of its communities. Liantang 
village has a long history and can date back to one thousand years ago. As a village, it has 
too many villagers to manage from the perspective of administration management, so in 
1997, the Liantang village was divided into five small villages or neighborhood committees 
(juweihui): Lianrong, Lianhua, Lianfeng, Lianguang, and Lianmei. At that time, most of the 
villagers' lands were not divided into five communities, and into each family as the 
household contract responsibility system (jiating lianchan chengbao zerenzhi)126 required. 
Instead, the local government created a Liantang village collective assets management 
leading group (LVCAMLG henceforth) to manage many collective assets, including lands. 
Thus, the majority of Liantang villagers' lands had not been controlled by Liantang villagers 
but by the LVCAMLG since 1997. This leading group was controlled by village cadres, 
 
126 China’s Reform and Opening-up policy began with the implementation of the household contract 
responsibility system in the rural area in 1978. This policy divided those lands in the rural area into 
each household to stimulate villagers’ initiative in promoting the efficiency of the yielding of the 
lands. But in rare cases, some villages did not implement this policy. 
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neighborhood committee directors, and other government officials. They had been 
selling/leasing out Liantang villagers' lands during the last twenty years without getting 
Liantang villagers' consent, and they did not give those villagers any compensation for 
selling their lands. As one of my interviewees said: 
"Many of these problems that villagers are protesting date back to 20 years ago. 
Although Liantang village as a village does not exist anymore, there was a Liantang 
village collective assets management leading group that controls many collective lands 
and other assets (this group had dissolved by December 2014.) ……In the past few 
years, the mountains and the land (in our village/community) have been taken away by 
local government (village/community level) and sold to private companies. These 
mountains have been dug up and look ugly. But us villagers did not get a penny from 
these corrupt officials. Where is the money for selling our lands and mountains?" 
(Interviewee B, March 4, 2019) 
       Thus, when the Liantang protest happened on October 25, 2012, the LVCAMLG had 
already sold/leased out many Liantang villagers' lands to private companies/persons. 
Because those transactions were protected by the < Contract Law of the People's Republic of 
China >, it is difficult for the local government to reverse those contracts. So, I define the 
situation at Liantang village as occurring at the “end-stage of the project,” although there 
was no particular project involved that triggered this protest. Rather, it is the local 
government's pattern of behavior of selling/leasing Liantang villagers' lands without their 
consent and not providing them with any compensation in the last twenty years. The price 
for the local government to reverse those lands selling/releasing contracts was very high, as 
those contracts were protected by the <Contract Law> of the PRC. So, the outcome of this 
protest for those villagers was a failure, as the local government did not give back their 
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lands, nor was the local government able to provide them with a significant amount of 
compensation for selling/leasing their valuable lands. 
        The Tianmu case is another example that fits in the category of “at the end stage of the 
project”. Also, the situation at Tianmu village was similar to the Liantang case, as there was 
no particular project involved, but rather the local government was selling their lands and 
not giving the villagers any benefits. In 1985, Mu Xiangyou became the Tianmu village 
deputy party secretary and general manager of the agricultural, industrial and commercial 
company127 of Tianmu village. In 1986, Mu Xiangyou was appointed as the Tianmu village 
party branch secretary, a position he held until September 2018. In 1987, he was elected as a 
member of the NPC, a position he held until March 2018 (Yang, 2007). Since 1986, he had 
been the most powerful person in Tianmu village, and many policies were made under his 
guidance. Because Tianmu village’s position is very important and due to China’s fast speed 
of urbanization in the last four decades, Tianmu village had become increasingly important 
because of its location, which connects Tianjin’s urban area and the suburb areas and now 
has become an urban area itself. At the same time, the lands have become a scarce resource 
for urban development. During the last three decades, since Mu Xiangyou became the “first 
fiddle” of Tianmu village, Tianmu villagers have lost thousands of mu of their land. Some of 
the villagers thought the Tianmu villagers sacrificed themselves for many infrastructure 
projects that were sponsored by the government. As one of my interviewees stated: 
 
127 The agricultural, industrial and commercial company of Tianmu village was founded in 1986. It 
controls collectively owned assets, including thirty-plus collectively owned enterprises in the 1980s 
and 1990s (Wei, 2017), and those collectively owned enterprises employed about 1,700 Tianmu 
villagers. According to Tianmu cunzhi (the local records of Tianmu village), 2007, there were fifteen 
collectively owned enterprises by 2003. But by 2015, only one collectively owned enterprise was left 
(Wei, 2017). Tianmu villagers were discontent with the fact that all but one collectively owned 
enterprise had collapsed because of those village cadres’ bad management. 
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“There was 7,000 mu of land at Tianmu village in 1948, but now we only have about 
1,000 mu of land left, the majority of which are villagers’ homesteads. Many of our 
lands were expropriated by those infrastructure projects sponsored by the government. 
Us villagers made a great contribution to our country, but we received little 
compensation for our sacrifice at that time.” (Interviewee BB, February 3, 2019) 
       The majority of Tianmu villagers blamed those corrupt village cadres for selling their 
lands without asking their opinions or giving them any compensation for selling/leasing 
their lands to private companies or businesspersons. One of my interviewees said: 
“Tianmu village is our root; the village committee should provide each villager with a 
suitable job as it did during the commune period. The village committee sold off all of 
our lands. Where can we villagers find jobs? We are farmers; we should at least have a 
piece of land to grow. If we have a piece of land, we can grow our vegetables. The 
problem is that we do not have any land left now. When the local government needs 
money, the township government and village committee have a discussion, and then they 
sell a piece of land off. They will not think about villagers when they are making 
decisions to sell our lands.” (Interviewee Z, February 2, 2019) 
       Some of the protesters were unsatisfied with the compensation they received from the 
local government, which expropriated villagers’ lands for infrastructure projects such as 
roads. One interviewee said: 
“My case is different from theirs,128 but what is the same is the unfairness involved. My 
house was not expropriated by the ‘urban village reconstruction project,’ but, instead, it 
 
128Many of those protest participants were people who were forcefully evicted from their houses by 
the local government. This was the trigger of the Tianmu protest, which started on January 12, 2015. 
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was expropriated for the ‘expanding the Jingjin Road Project.’ After I signed a contract 
with the local government, I saw a local government document that showed the 
compensation price for expropriating my house should be 28,000 yuan per square 
meter.129 But, in reality, I only received 5,250 yuan per square meter. My case happened 
several years ago. My house is about sixty square meters, so I only received about 
400,000 yuan as compensation, which means I lost 1,200,000 yuan for losing my home 
and homestead. I think the village committee embezzled my money. Where is the 
justice?” (Interviewee T, January 31, 2019) 
        The Tianmu village committee selling villagers’ lands without their consent and not 
giving them any compensation for selling/leasing their lands provided the most grievances 
and greatest motivation for Tianmu villagers to participate in this protest. But, the trigger of 
this protest was forced eviction, which started as early as 2011. As one interviewee put it: 
“We are against both corruption and Mu Xiangyou. Mu Xiangyou controlled the power 
in Tianmu village for more than 30 years. Not only has he never given a penny to 
villagers these years for selling our valuables, but he also forcefully evicted us from our 
houses during the recent urban village reconstruction process. Besides the above-
mentioned, he also beat us when evicting us from our houses…… He started to use force 
during the house demolition process in 2011, and he has forcefully evicted about 50 
households in Tianmu village since 2011. Villagers began to protest when they reached 
the end of their forbearance of Mu’s behavior. Take me as an example. I started to 
protest after I was evicted from my house by Mu, and because I am articulate, I was 
‘elected’ as one of the leaders of this protest.” (Interviewee O, January 31, 2019) 
 
129 The compensation price, including compensation for the house itself and the homestead, in which 
the building was based. 
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       During the last twenty to thirty years, the village committee under Mu Xiangyou’s 
influence sold off thousands of Tianmu villagers’ lands, but never gave them any 
compensation. When the Tianmu protest erupted in January 2015, those land transactions 
had been completed, and because of the <Contract Law> of the PRC, it is difficult for the 
local government to reverse those land selling/releasing contracts. So, the outcome of this 
protest came without any surprise, as it ended with failure for those protesters. Further, Mu 
Xiangyou is still free of investigation, even under the massive anti-corruption campaign 
launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013. Also, the Tianmu villagers have not received fair 
compensation for both losing their lands and their houses and homesteads for the 
restructuring village project.  
7.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I looked at the role of timing—i.e. at which stage of a development project 
large-scale land protests happened. If the protests happened at the early stage of a project, 
such as in the Guangji case and Shangpu case, the chances for protesters to achieve their 
goals were much greater, as little money had been invested by that point. If the protest 
happened in the middle of the project, it was more difficult to predict the outcome; it could 
be successful, as in the case of Fuyou. But that case also showed that a positive short-term 
outcome might not necessarily mean a positive long-term outcome for protesters. Moreover, 
if it is financially or symbolically costly for the local government to give in to protesters; for 
instance, if important sums of money have already been allocated, or if reversing the project 
would mean ‘losing face,’ the protests could experience a failed outcome. Although my case 
studies did not support this prediction, in theory, it could turn out this way. Finally, if large-
scale land protests happen at the end stage of a project, when villagers’ lands have already 
been sold off for many years, the likelihood for this kind of protest to succeed is very low, as 
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the Tianmu and Liantang cases showed. Overall, these findings are in line with Li’s (2016) 
findings on environmental protests in China. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
During the last three to four decades, China has experienced rapid economic growth, and the 
country is now the second largest economy in the world. However, this growth has taken 
place at the same time as many protests, many of which have been over land. So far, 
however, there has been limited research conducted on the factors that contribute to the 
outcome of those land protests, especially influential large-scale land protests.  
        After examining five of the largest land protests that occurred in China between 2012 
and 2017, I argued in this thesis that three factors affect the outcome of large-scale land 
protests in China. Protests are more likely to “succeed” and achieve their goals when 1) 
domestic media reports on this protest are supportive or on the protesters’ side, 2) the protests 
are violent, and 3) when the protests occur at the early stage of the developmental project. 
However, as the empirical evidence that drew on 244 media reports and 30 interviews 
showed, these factors did not work in isolation. Rather, my research finds that those variables 
all happen to coincide with the successful outcomes of the protests that I investigated in this 
research. For instance, if a protest was violent (e.g. if some protesters were killed or severely 
injured at the hands of local government forces or their proxies), it was more likely to be 
reported on by domestic media, and the majority of those reports were supportive of those 
protesters. However, if a protest was peaceful, it was less likely to be reported on by domesic 
media, and it was less likely to draw the central or provincial government’s attention. 
Therefore, it was less likely to succeed. Still, that does not mean that they must come together 
for demonstrators to win, and further research with more cases might show one variable is 
actually more important than the others. 
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8.1 Contributions to the literature 
Researchers have explored the importance of the influence of domestic media on protests for a 
long time, and most studies have focused on environmental protests in China (Mertha, 2008’ 
Li, 2016; Cai, 2010). My research substantiates some of their findings. My research found that 
Mertha (2008) and Li’s (2016) theories can be applied to other types of protests, namely land 
protests, in China. My research added to this conversation by differentiating between two roles 
that domestic media can play in protests: “catalyst” and “watchdog.” In the Fuyou case, 
domestic media played the role of “catalyst” for the protest to succeed. While, in the Guangji 
case, domestic media played the role of “watchdog,” because those protesters had already won 
that protest before domestic media reported on that case.   
        My work also contributed to the literature on protests by differentiating between short-
term outcomes and long-term outcomes: i.e. if protersters “win” in the short term, that does not 
guarantee that long-term outcomes will also be favorable. Although protesters in Wukan and 
Fuyou got what they wanted in the short term, they lost in the long term after the local 
government decided to retaliate against those protest leaders one year or two years later when 
no media was paying attention to them. Previous studies tended to focus mainly on the short-
term outcomes of these protests. As this study shows, it is also important to pay attention to the 
long-term outcomes of protests, including the strategies the local government uses to change 
the outcomes of those protests. 
         A third contribution of my work to the literature on protests is its emphasis on the role of 
domestic media—rather than international media—in China. International media can affect the 
outcome of a protest, as Hess (2015) demonstrated through the story of the Wukan protest, but 
domestic media can also play a significant role in determining the outcome of a protest. My 
research also found that not all domestic media reports are favorable to protesters. When 
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domestic media is on the local government’s side or adopts the local government’s framing, 
the outcome of a protest is more likely to fail.  
        My findings also concur with Cai (2010), Chen (2009, 2012) and Li’s (2016) research, 
which showed that violence plays an important role in deciding the outcome of a protest: the 
more violent a protest is, the more likely it will be to succeed. But if villagers use violence first, 
it may give the local government an excuse to frame the protest more favorably to the local 
government’s side, thereby further affecting the domestic media’s reporting on this protest, 
which may result in the protest failing. 
        Lastly, my reseach on large-scale land protests also concurs with Li’s (2016) research on 
environmental protests, which indicated that the timing of a protest will affect its outcome: If 
a protest occurs at the earlier stage of a project, it is more likely for the protesters to succeed; 
if the protest occurs at the end/late stage of the project or if it happens many years after the 
local government expropriated their lands, it is more likely that those protesters will get a 
failing result. 
8.2 Future Research 
There are some limitations to this study; for example, because I chose these five cases, but not 
other cases that may be more influential, or because I used the keyword “China” when I was 
searching the LexisNexis database, I may have missed some media reports that did not use the 
word “China,” thus affecting my case selection as well as my data collection. Besides that, 
those cases that have not been reported on by either domestic media or international media or 
by both could not enter the sight of this research; this may lead to bias against those cases. 
Therefore, the findings of this study may be limited and can not be applied to all cases. 
        A second limitation of this research is its time-period—i.e. from 2012 to 2017, when 
China’s domestic media’s environment was relatively unrestricted compared to the years after 
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2017, as there has been almost no domestic media reporting on any large-scale land protest in 
China since 2017. Thus, the findings of this research may not be used to explain today’s 
situation. 
        Since President Xi came to power in 2012, China’s domestic media has changed: many 
investigative reporters have lost their jobs (Gao, 2018), critical reports are becoming less 
common, and fewer domestic media dare to report on protests. At the same time, the ability of 
international media to cover China’s news on the ground has become more limited (Foreign 
Correspondents’ Club of China, 2018). Since 2014, the Chinese central government has also 
tightened control over domestic and international NGOs. Thus, under this new environment, 
do my findings still stand? This is unclear, especially regarding the role of domestic media. In 
addition, would my findings apply to other types of protests, e.g. protests over what Yang (2016) 
calls “open”, “half-open” or “closed” issues? 
      Future research would also do well to investigate why some large-scale land protests were 
reported on by domestic media while others were not. This may answer whether there is a 
“hand” that decides whether or not a protest can be reported on. Also, this issue is related to 
whether or not China’s domestic media can decide to report on a protest. If they have the 
freedom to report, then their reports can indicate their influence on society. If they do not have 
the freedom to report, then they are just acting on the government’s decision on whether or not 
they can report on a protest. Therefore, their influence on determining the outcome of a protest 
should be questioned. How does this relate to the outcome of that protest? In addition, future 
research may also focus on the role of social media in influencing the outcome of a large-scale 
land protest. Yang’s (2016) research found that social media can affect the outcome of a protest 
(i.e., the Wukan protest). But, because of the prevalence of China’s censorship (Roberts, 2018) 
on social media, it is difficult to collect data on China’s social media. Then, if future research 
could find enough data to answer this question, it would enrich our understanding of social 
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media and its influence in authoritarian regimes. Finally, future research should ask whether 
my findings also apply to other authoritarian regimes. My prediction is that the later two factors 
may also apply to other authoritarian regmes, but the first factor (the role of domestic media) 
may only be found in China. My reason is that only the Chinese government can reach that 
level of domestic media control, while most other authoritarian regimes cannot not achieve this. 
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Appendix: Additional Information on Interviews 
Interview Tianmu village (January 31, 2019 – February 10, 2019) 
  Date Place Type 
Location of 
interview 
Duration 
of 
recording 
Number of 
respondents 
1 January 31, 2019 Street intersection 
General 
public Tianmu village 10 1 
2 January 31, 2019 Restaurant Elite Beichen district 30 2 
3 January 31, 2019 Street intersection 
General 
public Tianmu village 53.50 7 
4 February 1, 2019 Street intersection 
General 
public Tianmu village 34 1 
5 February 1, 2019 Street 
General 
public Tianmu village 40 1 
6 February 1, 2019 Street intersection 
General 
public Tianmu village 21 1 
7 February 2,2019 
Street inside of 
Tianmucun 
General 
public Tianmu village 15 1 
8 February 2,2019 Library Elite Tianmu village 15 1 
9 
February 
10,2019 Street intersection 
General 
public Tianmu village 10 1 
Interview Guangji village (February 19, 2019 – February 24, 2019) 
  Date Place Type 
Location of 
interview 
Duration 
of 
recording 
Number of 
respondents 
1 February 19, 2019 Villager's home 
Generial 
public/Elite Guangji village 3 hours 6 
2 February 24, 2019 Villager's home 
Generial 
public/Elite Guangji village 3 hours130 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
130 The recording of this interview was not successful. 
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Interview Fuyou village (February 21, 2019-February 26, 2019) 
 
Interview Liantang village (March 1, 2019 – March 9, 2019) 
  Date Place Type 
Location of 
interview 
Duration 
of 
recording 
Number of 
respondents 
1 March 1, 2019 Restaurant 
Generial 
public Liantang village 20 1 
2 March 4, 2019 Ancestral Hall  Elite Liantang village 30 1 
3 March 6, 2019 Villager's home 
Generial 
public Liantang village 52 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Date Place Type 
Location of 
interview 
Duration 
of 
recording 
Number of 
respondents 
1 
February 20, 
2019 Villager's home 
Generial 
public Fuyou village 60 1 
2 
February 22, 
2019 Villager's vehicle 
Generial 
public Fuyou village 25 1 
3 
February 22, 
2019 Villager's home 
Generial 
public Fuyou village 60 2 
4 
February 22, 
2019 Villager's home 
Generial 
public Fuyou village 24 2 
5 
September 
5,2019 Wechat 
Generial 
public Wechat 30 1 
